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Sonia K . Katyal* & Ilona M . Turner**
Despite the growing recognition of transgender rights in both law and cul-
ture, there is one area of law that has lagged behind: family law’s treatment
of transgender parents . We perform an investigation of the way that
transgender parents are treated in case law and discover striking results re-
garding the outcomes for transgender parents within the family court system .
Despite significant gains for transgender plaintiffs in employment and other
areas of law, the evidence reveals an array of ways in which the family court
system has systematically alienated the rights and interests of transgender
parents . In many cases involving custody or visitation, we find that the
transgender parent loses their bid, sometimes even losing their right to be rec-
ognized as a parent . This absence of equal treatment is striking and deserving
of analysis, particularly given the law’s shift toward a standard that is sup-
posed to minimize the risk of bias in LGBT parenting cases . In a striking
number of cases, however, we found evidence of persistent bias regarding the
gender identity and expression of the transgender parent—which we refer to
as transition, contagion, and volition related concerns—that underscores the
courts’ analysis . Normatively, this Article calls for a deeper interrogation of
the ways in which family equality can be expanded—and even reoriented—to
better protect the interests of transgender parents within the family law sys-
tem . As a solution, we propose a way to balance courts’ broad discretion with
the disproportionate risk that bias will infect the decisionmaking, resulting in
irreparable harm to both the child and the parent .
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INTRODUCTION
In an opening scene from the Emmy Award–winning show Transparent,
Jeffrey Tambor plays Maura, a transgender woman who is in the early stages
of explaining to her three children that she plans to transition.1 At one point,
one of the daughters, Sarah, says to Maura, with a hint of disbelief, “Can you
just help me out here? Are you saying you’re gonna start dressing up like a
lady all the time?”2 Maura laughs, and then says to her, “No.”3 She continues,
1. Amazon Studios, Transparent: The Letting Go, AMAZON (Sept. 26, 2014),
https://www.amazon.com/The-Letting-Go/dp/B00I3MOT0Y/ [https://perma.cc/J8DU-ALT9].
2 . Id . at 2:09–2:17.
3 . Id . at 2:17.
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“my whole life I’ve been dressing up . . . like a man.”4 She pulls Sarah’s hand
to her chest and then says, gently, “This is me.”5
Although Transparent faced a number of cogent critiques from both in-
side and outside of the transgender community,6 it was the first mainstream
television drama to focus on a transgender woman as the central character,
telling her story in a way that captured the complexity following her transi-
tion. Transparent made its debut around the same period that several
transgender women—Caitlyn Jenner, Laverne Cox, and Janet Mock—also
received widespread public attention, bringing one mainstream magazine to
proclaim 2014 the “Transgender Tipping Point.”7
But amidst the greater strides toward inclusion on television and social
media, it is worth remembering some other, more sobering realities. The
year 2017 was the deadliest year for transgender people in modern history,
and the statistics for 2018 are not much better.8 In 2017 the U.S. Department
of Justice reversed the previous administration’s position on transgender in-
clusion in public schools, thereby allowing schools to discriminate on the ba-
sis of gender identity.9 The current commander in chief ordered a ban on
service by transgender people in the armed forces, which was quickly en-
4 . Id . at 2:21–2:25.
5 . Id . at 2:26–2:32.
6 . See, e .g ., Steven Funk & Jaydi Funk, Transgender Dispossession in Transparent: Com-
ing Out as a Euphemism for Honesty, 20 SEXUALITY & CULTURE 879 (2016); Marcy Cook, Why
Transparent Has Lost the Trust of the Trans Community, MARY SUE (Feb. 4, 2015, 8:00 PM),
https://www.themarysue.com/transparent-trust/ [https://perma.cc/U62U-QKG9]; Cael Kee-
gan, Op-ed: How Transparent Tried and Failed to Represent Trans Men, ADVOCATE (Oct. 22,
2014, 10:00 AM), https://www.advocate.com/commentary/2014/10/22/op-ed-how-
transparent-tried-and-failed-represent-trans-men [https://perma.cc/ALL2-KSTL]. In 2017,
Tambor was fired from the show due to allegations of sexual harassment. Yohana Desta,
Transparent Plots a Way Forward After Jeffrey Tambor’s Messy Firing, VANITY FAIR (June 12,
2018, 9:16 AM), https://www .vanityfair .com/hollywood/2018/06/transparent-final-season-
ending-jeffrey-tambor [https://perma.cc/JL39-NN28].
7 . See TIME, June 9, 2014 (titling the issue “The Transgender Tipping Point”); Saman-
tha Allen, Whatever Happened to the Transgender Tipping Point?, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 31, 2017,
1:02 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/whatever-happened-to-the-transgender-tipping-
point? [https://perma.cc/53SX-RSAN] (describing the cover of Time’s June 9, 2014 issue as a
declaration that 2014 was the “Transgender Tipping Point”).
8 . See Sarah McBride, HRC & Trans People of Color Coalition Release Report on Vio-
lence Against the Transgender Community, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://www.hrc.org/blog/hrc-trans-people-of-color-coalition-release-report-on-violence-
against-the [https://perma.cc/N6BK-3XBL]; see also Lauren Lee, Transgender Community Fac-
es Its Deadliest Year, but This Group Wants to Help, CNN (June 11, 2018, 7:51 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/11/us/sproj-iyw-anti-violence-project-transgender-
violence/index.html [https://perma.cc/8BMF-A2YY].
9. Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
Dear Colleague Letter (Feb. 22, 2017); see also Ariane de Vogue et al., Trump Administration
Withdraws Federal Protections for Transgender Students, CNN (Feb. 23, 2017, 10:16 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/22/politics/doj-withdraws-federal-protections-on-transgender-
bathrooms-in-schools/index.html [https://perma.cc/8N2K-VP7Z].
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joined by multiple federal courts on constitutional grounds.10 In October
2018, the New York Times reported that the Trump Administration would
seek to go even further: to “defin[e] gender as a biological, immutable condi-
tion” that is determined by one’s genitalia at birth, for the purpose of rolling
back protections for transgender individuals.11
Despite these steps backward from the White House, it is also important
to note how much progress has been made elsewhere.12 State legislatures and
courts across the country have lowered barriers to obtaining legal recogni-
tion by, for example, removing the requirement that a person undergo sur-
gery before they can change the gender marker on a driver’s license.13 A
(now) near-unanimous wave of court decisions, many at the circuit level, has
held that transgender individuals are protected from discrimination under
sex-discrimination laws like Title IX and Title VII14—a position still defend-
ed by the EEOC despite the Department of Justice adopting a contrary posi-
10 . See, e .g ., Stockman v. Trump, 331 F. Supp. 3d 990 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (denying motion
to dissolve preliminary injunction), appeal filed, No. 18-56539 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 2018), stay of
preliminary injunction granted, 139 S. Ct. 950 (2019); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747 (D.
Md. 2017) (granting preliminary injunction), appeal dismissed, No. 17-2398, 2018 WL 2717050
(4th Cir. Feb. 2, 2018), stay of preliminary injunction granted, No. GLR-17-2459 (D. Md. Mar.
7, 2019), ECF No. 249; Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C. 2017) (granting prelimi-
nary injunction), rev’d, Doe 2 v. Shanahan, No. 18-5257, 2019 WL 102309 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4,
2019). After Supreme Court rulings in January 2019 lifted two of the preliminary injunctions,
the remaining injunctions were subsequently lifted by the lower courts, and the ban took effect
on April 12, 2019, although lawsuits continued. See Erik Larson, Ban on Trans People in Mili-
tary Cleared to Take Effect April 12, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 26, 2019, 5:34 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-26/ban-on-trans-people-in-military-
cleared-to-take-effect-april-12 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
11. Erica L. Green et al., ‘Transgender’ Could Be Defined Out of Existence Under Trump
Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/21/us/politics/
transgender-trump-administration-sex-definition.html?module=inline
[https://perma.cc/36SC-S2VQ].
12 . See Sonia K. Katyal, The Numerus Clausus of Sex, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 389, 390–92
(2017).
13 . See 1 SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 10:11 (Karen Moulding in conjunction
with Nat’l Lawyers Guild eds., 2018) (citing jurisdictions that have removed surgery require-
ments).
14 . See, e .g ., EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 574–75
(6th Cir. 2018) (holding “discrimination on the basis of transgender and transitioning status
violates Title VII”), cert . granted, No. 18-107, 2019 WL 1756679 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2019) (granting
review of “the following question: Whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against
transgender people based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price
Waterhouse v . Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)”); Whitaker ex rel . Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1049 (7th Cir. 2017) (“A policy that requires an
individual to use a bathroom that does not conform with his or her gender identity punishes
that individual for his or her gender non-conformance, which in turn violates Title IX.”);
Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[D]iscrimination against a
transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination . . . .”);
Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that discrimination
against a transgender woman is “literally discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ ” prohibited under
Title VII).
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tion.15 Although transgender individuals have enjoyed some increased pro-
tection in the courts, their interests are distinctly vulnerable in the face of a
president and a Supreme Court that may give priority to the rights of those
who would discriminate against LGBT individuals.
Indeed, just as we are starting to recognize greater protections for
transgender, nonbinary, and gender variant individuals under the law,16 we
are also driven to confront the many ways in which this recognition is just
one small step toward equalizing the law’s treatment of transgender individ-
uals. Even if jurisdictions increase their recognition of transition and take
greater steps toward protecting transgender individuals in the workplace,
there are other areas of law—criminal law, privacy law, and constitutional
law—that deserve a much more searching interrogation of how they may
systematically disadvantage the interests of transgender people.
Enter family law, which has received only scant attention from legal
scholars regarding its intersections with the rights of transgender individu-
als.17 For example, until 2017, transgender individuals in over twenty coun-
tries that have signed on to the European Convention on Human Rights
were required to undergo sterilization before they were able to change their
name or other legal documents, effectively foreclosing their ability to have
biological children.18 Although these laws are now called into question due
15 . Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 574–75 (holding “discrimination on the basis of
transgender and transitioning status violates Title VII”); Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No.
0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *7–9, *11 (Apr. 20, 2012) (“[I]ntentional discrimination
against a transgender individual because that person is transgender is, by definition, discrimi-
nation ‘based on . . . sex . . . .’ ”); What You Should Know About EEOC and the Enforcement
Protections for LGBT Workers, U.S. EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/
enforcement_protections_lgbt_workers.cfm [https://perma.cc/85EM-LJHM].
16. These terms are in some respect synonymous, since a broad definition of
“transgender” includes anyone who doesn’t conform to gender stereotypes, and since being
transgender is always in some sense gender nonconforming (or variant) in relation to the gen-
der assigned at birth. But it is often difficult to find a term that everyone finds comfort with.
For example, many trans people might bristle at being considered “nonconforming” or “gen-
der variant”; and many gender nonconforming people—that is, people whose gender expres-
sion is different from that stereotypically associated with their gender or their sex assigned at
birth—do not identify as transgender. We also use the terms “gender” and “sex” interchangea-
bly, since sex is ultimately an amorphous concept that includes a multitude of factors (includ-
ing hormones, external reproductive organs, internal reproductive organs, secondary sex
characteristics, sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression) that may or may
not all point in the same direction, and where those factors are inconsistent is best determined
by deference to a person’s gender identity. For a longer discussion, see Katyal, supra note 12.
Likewise, we do not distinguish between “gender” and “gender identity,” because gender is best
defined by a person’s gender identity. Id . See, for example, the 2017 California law that permits
an individual to correct the gender marker on a birth certificate based on a simple personal
affidavit that the change is necessary to reflect the person’s gender identity. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 103426 (West Supp. 2019).
17 . See infra note 22; see also Beth A Haines et al., Making Trans Parents Visible: Inter-
sectionality of Trans and Parenting Identities, 24 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 238 (2014).
18 . See A.P. v. France, App. Nos. 79885/12, 52471/13 & 52596/13 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 6,
2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-172913 [https://perma.cc/L5KS-F4S3] (holding
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to a recent European Court ruling,19 other countries, including Japan, still
have these reproductive restrictions in place.20
Many of these sorts of restrictions often escape public attention. Surpris-
ingly, despite the attention given to the rights of transgender individuals in
the United States, including the rights of children,21 there is comparably
much less legal scholarship regarding the rights of transgender parents.
There are only a smattering of law articles on the topic, and only a few of
these address the topic in any depth.22
that conditioning recognition of transition on medical or surgical treatment that results in ster-
ilization violates an individual’s right to respect for their private life under Article 8 of the Eu-
ropean Union Convention on Human Rights); see also Harriet Agerholm, Japan Urged to Scrap
Law Forcing Transgender People to Be Sterilised Before They Can Transition, INDEPENDENT
(Dec. 1, 2017, 11:17 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/japan-transgender-
people-sterilise-before-transition-gender-change-lgbt-rights-a8086341.html
[https://perma.cc/Q9AP-GP63].
19 . A .P ., App. Nos. 79885/12, 52471/13 & 52596/13, at ¶ 135.
20. Agerholm, supra note 18.
21 . See, e .g ., Scott Skinner-Thompson & Ilona M. Turner, Title IX’s Protections for
Transgender Student Athletes, 28 WIS. J.L., GENDER & SOC’Y 271 (2013).
22 . See, e .g ., Helen Y. Chang, My Father Is a Woman, Oh No!: The Failure of the Courts
to Uphold Individual Substantive Due Process Rights for Transgender Parents Under the Guise of
the Best Interest of the Child, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 649 (2003); Shannon Price Minter,
Transgender Family Law, 56 FAM. CT. REV. 410 (2018); Mark Strasser, Defining Sex: On Mar-
riage, Family, and Good Public Policy, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 57 (2010); Kari J. Carter, Note,
The Best Interest Test and Child Custody: Why Transgender Should Not Be a Factor in Custody
Determinations, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 209 (2006); Charles Cohen, Note, Losing Your Children:
The Failure to Extend Civil Rights Protections to Transgender Parents, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
536 (2017); Shannon Shafron Perez, Note, Is It a Boy or a Girl? Not the Baby, the Parent:
Transgender Parties in Custody Battles and the Benefit of Promoting a Truer Understanding of
Gender, 9 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 367 (2010). Aside from these articles, there are a
few books that have chapters that discuss the issue in some detail, including CARLOS A. BALL,
THE RIGHT TO BE PARENTS: LGBT FAMILIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF PARENTHOOD
(2012), and Taylor Flynn, The Ties that (Don’t) Bind: Transgender Family Law and the Unmak-
ing of Families, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 32 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006). Another book
that features valuable information and perspectives, including personal reflections on transi-
tion and divorce, is LGBT DIVORCE AND RELATIONSHIP DISSOLUTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE (Abbie E. Goldberg & Adam P.
Romero, eds., 2019). We call particular attention to two chapters within this book: Denise Bro-
gan-Cantor, Transition Through a Shattered Glass Snowglobe: Reflections on Transitioning and
Divorce, in LGBT DIVORCE AND RELATIONSHIP DISSOLUTION, supra at 327, and Amanda
Veldorale Griffin, A Daughter of a Transgender Parent’s Perspective on Relationship Dissolu-
tion, in LGBT DIVORCE AND RELATIONSHIP DISSOLUTION, supra at 340 . These issues are also
discussed in some practice guides for attorneys, including the excellent TRANSGENDER FAMILY
LAW (Jennifer L. Levi & Elizabeth E. Monnin-Browder eds., 2012). See also FAQ About
Transgender Parenting, LAMBDA LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-
rights/article/trans-parenting-faq [https://perma.cc/WSK4-MQT9]; Promising Practices for
Serving Transgender & Non-Binary Foster and Adoptive Parents, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
https://www.hrc.org/resources/all-children-all-families-serving-trans-non-binary-foster-
adoptive-parents [https://perma.cc/5ACS-A4CU]; Protecting the Rights of Transgender Parents
and Their Children: A Guide for Parents and Lawyers, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/report/
protecting-rights-transgender-parents-and-their-children [https://perma.cc/TUX8-P4BF];
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To remedy this absence, we conducted a search for transgender and
gender variant parents within the case law and literature.23 We found many
more cases than the literature discussed, and even many cases supporting the
rights of trans parents as well. Yet overall, the results are striking and unfor-
gettable. In many cases, transgender and gender nonconforming parents lost
their bids for custody or visitation. And in a few cases, transgender and gen-
der variant parents had their parental rights terminated or narrowed based
solely on their decision to transition.24 These decisions do not just harm the
transgender parent; they also inflict harm on children who are denied their
ability to bond with a known parent when a transgender parent has been
pushed aside, despite their desire to remain a part of their child’s family.
This Article has four parts, spanning history, doctrine, and public policy.
In Part I, we account for the various ways in which transgender persons have
formed families and received unequal treatment at the hands of family court
judges, prior to the legislative enactments and constitutional rulings that
guaranteed marriage equality across the nation. In Part II, we provide a short
background on how family courts have addressed the standards of custody
and visitation, drawing on the case law addressing the rights of lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender parents.
Transgender Family Law Facts, TRANSGENDER L. CTR., http://transgenderlawcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/Family-Law-Facts-301013-web-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y2V-
HG4N]. For an important literature review on transgender parenting research, see REBECCA L.
STOTZER ET AL., TRANSGENDER PARENTING: A REVIEW OF EXISTING RESEARCH, WILLIAMS
INST. (2014), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/transgender-
parenting-oct-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM2U-PP9Q].
23. In order to locate these cases, we put in the following search terms: “transgender
parent”; “cross dress” + “parent”; “transsexual parent”; and “transvestite parent.” We used
these terms not because we agreed with the terminology used, but because our research showed
that courts used these terms, and thus the terms would locate the cases most likely to address
the issue of transgender parenting decisions. We pulled up a total of thirty cases that turned
out to be directly on or related to the subject of transgender parenthood—specifically issues of
child custody and caregiving where a transgender person is involved in the child’s life.
24 . See infra Part III. In this Article, we use the term transgender to broadly include in-
dividuals whose gender identity or expression does not conform to the social expectations that
generally accompany the sex assigned at their birth. See Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms Un-
der the Transgender Umbrella, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 3–4. As Professor
Susan Stryker has noted, the term refers to “all identities or practices that cross over, cut across,
move between, or otherwise queer socially constructed sex/gender boundaries,” and is often
used to denote a pluralistic variety of differing identities. Susan Stryker, My Words to Victor
Frankenstein Above the Village of Chamounix: Performing Transgender Rage, in THE
TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER 244, 254 n.2 (Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006); see
also JACK HALBERSTAM, TRANS* (2018). Following these approaches, we adopt a broad con-
struction of the term “transgender” that includes a variety of gender nonconforming identities
and expressions, but we note that some cases may involve parents who undergo the process of
transition, and other cases involve parents who may engage in gender nonconforming activi-
ties or expression (cross-dressing privately, for example) but who do not wish to transition.
Thus, we included both groups in our analysis and note the potential distinction between
them.
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Part III examines how those custody and visitation standards have ap-
plied to transgender parents. Our analysis is based on a collection of thirty
opinions, which, we hope, represents every (published or unpublished) cus-
tody and visitation case involving a transgender or gender variant parent
since the 1970s.25 That treatment has paralleled in many ways the evolution
of the treatment of lesbian, gay, and bisexual parents in family court pro-
ceedings. The earliest cases involving LGB parents found that, per se, custody
or contact with such a parent would obviously be against a child’s best inter-
est, without the need for specific findings or evidence to support that conclu-
sion. By the 1990s, however, courts in most states had shifted to a rule
requiring at least some evidence of the harm that the parent’s sexual orienta-
tion would allegedly cause the child. This is commonly known as the “nexus”
test.26
While some early cases were willing to entirely sever or disregard the
rights of transgender parents, more recent case law has avoided such per se
determinations. Despite these developments, our investigation shows that
bias against transgender parents continues to appear throughout court opin-
ions. Drawing on existing case law and legal scholarship, we present a model
that analyzes a variety of observations offered by courts, each of which sug-
gests three types of biases that serve as proxies for discriminatory treatment.
While courts today rarely reject transgender parents’ claims outright, they
instead offer analysis that is indirectly tied to the parents’ transgender sta-
tus—analysis that is tied to concerns about transition, for example—that
winds up disadvantaging the interests of transgender parents. Second, courts
also express concerns about the transmission of gender nonconforming be-
havior to the child, thereby destabilizing the child’s own gender identity or
sexual orientation, what we describe as concerns about contagion. A final set
of concerns are directed more specifically to parents who engage in gender
variant activities, like cross-dressing, even when this behavior takes place
outside of the child’s purview. We analyze these concerns and situate them
within a larger anxiety about gender volition, that is, the idea that a parent’s
nonconforming gender expression or behavior will negatively affect a child.
In the final section, we propose alternative ways to guide judges’ treat-
ment of transgender parents in the family court system. Because decades of
experience with the nexus test has proven that it is still susceptible to implicit
bias, we posit that the only way to guarantee fair consideration that takes in-
to account both the rights of transgender parents and the actual needs of
their children is to completely prohibit consideration of a parent’s
transgender identity or expression, as well as consideration of any factors
25. Our analysis follows a similar set of inquiries as Cliff Rosky in his excellent article,
Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the Gender of Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 257 (2009).
26 . See COURTNEY G. JOSLIN ET AL., LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER
FAMILY LAW § 1:2 (2018).
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that may be used as proxies for such status, such as concerns about stigma or
a child’s anxiety about transition.
Admittedly, the cases we examine are small in number, but they are
deeply instructive in terms of how the law must evolve in the coming era.
Our goal is to offer insight for both lawyers and judges, but also for legal
scholars considering family law’s disparities. One crucial step in equalizing
families involves taking stock of existing research on transgender parenting
and noting where the law has failed to protect the interests of transgender
parents. As we argue, the need to perform a thorough investigation of the
past treatment of transgender parents is especially important, not just be-
cause of the demographic shifts in transgender parenthood but also because
of the added analytical insight that these cases offer into the need for change
within family law as a whole.
A final point deserves mention. At the same time that these results—and
this Article—suggest a persistent inequality, it is also important to note that
these cases are but a very small snapshot of the spectrum of transgender par-
enting, kinship, and caregiving, which are almost all taking place, without
conflict or crisis, outside of the shadows of the courtroom. Consequently, at
the same time we are mindful of the growing spectrum of transgender par-
enting, we are also acutely mindful of the ways in which the courts have not
yet caught up with the reality of this spectrum. Taking stock of this reality—
which, the research reveals, is often not that different from any other fami-
ly—is a first step in building out a cohesive and comprehensive system that
treats all families fairly.27
I. TRANSGENDER FAMILY FORMATION AND RECOGNITION
Ten years ago, Thomas Beatie, a transgender man, created an interna-
tional stir when he announced that he was pregnant in an article in the Ad-
27. In doing this work, as two queer cisgender women, we are acutely mindful of the
importance, as Paisley Currah, Richard Juang, and Shannon Minter have reminded us, of en-
suring gender self-determination as an imperative matter of “well-being” rather than “an intel-
lectual curiosity.” Paisley Currah et al., Introduction, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 22,
at xiii, xxii; see also M. Dru Levasseur, Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating the Law to Reflect
Modern Medical Science Is Key to Transgender Rights, 39 VT. L. REV. 943, 947 (2015) (“For
transgender people to be recognized as full human beings under the law, the legal system must
make room for the existence of transgender people—not as boundary-crossers but as people
claiming their birthright as part of a natural variation of human sexual development.”). Despite
our histories of advocacy in allyship with trans communities and our connections with trans,
gender nonconforming, and gender variant chosen family, it is important to acknowledge the
inherent limitations of our perspectives as cisgender women. See JULIA SERANO, WHIPPING
GIRL: A TRANSSEXUAL WOMAN ON SEXISM AND THE SCAPEGOATING OF FEMININITY 209–12
(2007); Jacob Hale, Suggested Rules for Non-Transsexuals Writing About Transsexuals, Trans-
sexuality, Transsexualism, or Trans___, SANDY STONE (Nov. 18, 2009),
http://sandystone.com/hale.rules.html [http://perma.cc/9T6W-8ERX] (observing the im-
portance of interrogating one’s subject position and goals in writing about the trans communi-
ty).
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vocate magazine.28 Despite the sensationalist accounts of Beatie’s pregnancy,
it is important to note that ten years later, the visibility of trans parents has
become much less remarkable. Of course, transgender people form families
through a variety of means, just as other queer and straight people do, in-
cluding adoption, alternative insemination of a female partner by a sperm
donor, or through conventional means in a different-sex marriage before
coming out as trans. Today, an estimated 1.4 million members of the popu-
lation identify as transgender, and a large proportion of them are also rais-
ing—and having—children at the same time, as we discuss below.29
It bears mentioning that during that time, and for the last forty years,
courts have considered cases involving transgender parents regarding mat-
ters of divorce, custody, and visitation. Before we discuss the legal treatment
of transgender parents in family court cases, however, it is important to take
stock of how transgender parents form and raise families, and then specifi-
cally interrogate how the law has historically applied these general rules to
transgender parents.
It should be noted that even Beatie’s marriage was eventually scrutinized
by the courts, precisely because of his pregnancy and childbirth. When
Beatie and his wife sought a divorce in 2012, the Arizona family court judge
hearing the case initially ruled that their marriage appeared to be an invalid
same-sex marriage because, even though Beatie had obtained a new birth
certificate recognizing him as male prior to the marriage, he had retained his
reproductive capacity that the court viewed as inherently “female.”30 The
state’s court of appeals reversed that order, however, holding that Beatie’s
amended birth certificate from Hawaii must be given full faith and credit,
and further holding that denying recognition would violate his constitution-
al rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.31 The
appellate court also noted that the right to procreate is “one of the basic civil
rights of man,”32 a “liberty interest afforded special constitutional protec-
tion.”33 To deny Beatie recognition as a man because he chose to maintain
28 . See Thomas Beatie, Labor of Love, ADVOCATE (Mar. 14, 2008, 12:00 AM),
https://www.advocate.com/news/2008/03/14/labor-love [https://perma.cc/Z677-KUKN].
29. ANDREW R. FLORES ET AL., HOW MANY ADULTS IDENTIFY AS TRANSGENDER IN THE
UNITED STATES?, WILLIAMS INST. 2 (June 2016), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/How-Many-Adults-Identify-as-Transgender-in-the-United-States.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G5A3-4R84]; see STOTZER ET AL., supra note 22. For a fuller discussion of the
history of the transgender community in the United States, and the legal trajectory of the
transgender movement, see SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY (rev. ed. 2017).
30. Michael Kiefer, ‘Pregnant Man’s’ Divorce Case Leaves Judge in Doubt, USA TODAY
(Dec. 12, 2012, 8:22 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2012/12/12/pregnant-mans-
divorce-case/1765359/ [https://perma.cc/32MY-EKBU].
31. Beatie v. Beatie, 333 P.3d 754 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
32 . Id . at 760 n.10 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel . Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942)).
33 . Id . at 759 n.10.
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his reproductive capacity and have children would violate that foundational
constitutional right: the right to create a family.
A. Transgender Family Formation
A recent article by Shannon Price Minter, arguably the nation’s leading
expert on transgender family law, describes the various ways that trans and
gender variant people create families and how those families are treated by
the state.34 As he explains, most transgender parents today became parents
through typical means prior to transitioning: either intentionally having
children before medically transitioning, or having children during a prior
relationship before coming out as transgender.35 Every state will recognize
such individuals as legal parents from the outset, provided that they either
carried the child, were married to the person who carried the child, or, for
unmarried partners, signed a legal declaration of paternity.36 Unmarried
partners who intentionally bring a child that is not genetically related to one
parent into the world can also ensure legal recognition through adoption or
a court order recognizing the person as a parent.37 As Minter observes, “once
a person becomes a legal parent, the fact that the person later undergoes a
gender transition does not affect the person’s continued legal status as a par-
ent. If the person was a legal parent before transitioning, the person contin-
ues to be a legal parent after transitioning.”38 Finally, even in the absence of
those formal means of confirming the parent–child relationship, many states
now recognize some form of equitable parentage for a person who has func-
tioned as the child’s parent.39
A 2011 national survey of transgender participants found that 38% of re-
spondents were parents, noting that over 80% of those who transitioned after
the age of fifty-five were parents.40 In the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey per-
formed by the National Center for Transgender Equality, 18% of respond-
ents reported having children, and 69% of those were out as transgender to
their children.41
Although there is not a great deal of research on the effect of a parent’s
transition on child development,42 the earliest research suggested that a par-
34. Minter, supra note 22.
35 . Id . at 412–14.
36 . Id . at 412–13.
37 . Id . at 416.
38 . Id . at 413.
39 . Id . at 416.
40. Haines et al., supra note 17, at 239 (citing JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT
EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY (2011),
https://endtransdiscrimination.org/PDFs/NTDS_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3S3-D8L2]).
41. SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 66
(2016), https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3QYX-D4D9].
42. As Sally Hines has insightfully written,
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ent’s transition did not adversely impact children’s development.43 One of
the most cited studies, performed by Richard Green, concluded in 1978 that
“children being raised by transsexual or homosexual parents do not differ
appreciably from children raised in more conventional family settings on . . .
measures of sexual identity.”44 Twenty years later, the author reached the
same conclusion after a subsequent study, observing that “[a]vailable evi-
dence does not support concerns that a parent’s transsexualism directly ad-
versely impacts . . . the children.”45 “By contrast,” Green noted, “there is
extensive clinical experience showing the detriment to children in conse-
quence of terminated contact with a parent after divorce.”46
The most comprehensive review of transgender parenting research was
performed by the Williams Institute in 2014, which reviewed fifty-one stud-
ies that included research on transgender parents.47 The study offers a much
more detailed picture of transgender parent demographics than previously
available, finding that studies found that “between one quarter and one half
of transgender people report being parents,” with higher percentages of
transgender women than transgender men.48 The study has a number of val-
uable insights, but three are particularly notable for our purposes.
First, the Williams Institute study found that in its review of all of the
existing literature, “the vast majority [of transgender parents] reported that
their relationships are good or positive generally, including after ‘coming
out’ as transgender or transitioning.”49 Following a period of adjustment,50
the partnering and parenting practices of trans people are not only neglected with-
in sociologies of the family, but also go unrecognized within gender research. As
such, transgender lives and experiences remain absent from these analytical
frameworks, which rest on an uninformative and naturalized binary gender model
that recognizes only male or female gender categories.
Sally Hines, Intimate Transitions: Transgender Practices of Partnering and Parenting, 40
SOCIOLOGY 353, 355 (2006).
43 . See Richard Green, Transsexuals’ Children, INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM, Oct.–Dec.
1998. But see Tonya White & Randi Ettner, Disclosure, Risks and Protective Factors for Children
Whose Parents Are Undergoing a Gender Transition, J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY, no. 1-
2, 2004, at 129, 131 [hereinafter White & Ettner, Disclosure] (noting that Green did not use a
control group). More recent studies indicate that children, particularly preadolescent children,
adjust well to gender transition, and that postponing a transition or not disclosing a transition
places children at greater risk of damaging their emotional health than the transition itself. See
id . at 142 (noting that failure to disclose or postponement places children at greater risk than
transition); Tonya White & Randi Ettner, Adaptation and Adjustment in Children of Transsex-
ual Parents, 16 EUR. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 215, 215 (2007) (noting that preado-
lescent children adjust well post-transition).
44. Richard Green, Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or Transsexual
Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692, 696–97 (1978).
45. Green, supra note 43, at 4.
46 . Id .
47 . See STOTZER ET AL., supra note 22, at 1–2.
48 . Id . at 2.
49 . Id . at 2. Consider some quotes from Green’s 1998 study:
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studies indicate that “relationships may be just as strong, or even stronger
than before.”51 Other recent academic research echoes these conclusions and
suggests that the majority of transgender parents report having good rela-
tionships with their children, particularly after coming out or transitioning.52
Indeed, in a recent study, an overwhelming majority of respondents—70
percent—reported that their children continued a relationship with them af-
ter they came out as transgender.53
Second, the Williams Institute reports that studies “found no evidence
that having a transgender parent affects a child’s gender identity or sexual
orientation development, nor has an impact on other developmental mile-
stones.”54 Indeed, some research cited by the Williams study noted that
transgender parents increase the likelihood of positive outcomes, like accept-
ing differences and embracing diversity.55 The most recent study we found,
published in 2018 in Belgium, performed a series of in-depth interviews with
minor children.56 Although the study recognized, in some detail, that a gen-
der transition can be a “challenging and emotional process for the entire
family,” it noted that “most of the children we interviewed did not experi-
“Linda wants to be a woman. Linda wants to start a fresh life. She likes living as a
woman. I think that is happy for her. At first (when I was 4 ½) I didn’t quite un-
derstand. As I got older, I realized she must be happy living as a woman, so I’ll just
accept that.” (7 year old son of a trans woman).
Id . at 10 (quoting Green, supra note 43, at 3). Or:
“My Mother’s not happy in the body she is in. My mom is a lot happier since
starting to live as who she wants to be. When I was 13, my mother said, ‘I want to
be a man, do you care?’ I said, no, as long as you are the same person inside and
still love me. I don’t care what you are on the outside . . . It’s like a chocolate bar.
It’s got a new wrapper but it’s the same chocolate inside.” (14 year old daughter of
a trans man).
Id . (quoting Green, supra note 43, at 3).
50 . See ARLENE ISTAR LEV, TRANSGENDER EMERGENCE (2004) (cited in STOTZER ET AL.,
supra note 22, at 9–10) (discussing four stages of adjustment: The first involves disclosure,
where the transgender parent informs the child of their transgender identity. A second stage of
turmoil ensues, where the family starts to grapple with the transition. This leads to a third
stage, which Lev refers to as the negotiation stage, and the final stage is the balanced stage,
where parties adjust to the new normal post-transition). The Lev study is limited to parents
who “come out” as transgender after having a child, not someone who has already transitioned
by the time of family formation. Id . at 9–10.
51. STOTZER ET AL., supra note 22, at 10 (citing GRANT ET AL., supra note 40, and JACK
PYNE, TRANSFORMING FAMILY: TRANS PARENTS AND THEIR STRUGGLES, STRATEGIES, AND
STRENGTHS (2012), http://lgbtqpn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Transforming-Family-
Report-Final-Version-updated-Sept-30-2014-reduced.pdf [https://perma.cc/NKH8-RUDX]).
52 . Id . at 2 (reviewing articles on the subject of transgender parents).
53. Haines, supra note 17, at 239 (citing GRANT ET AL., supra note 40).
54. STOTZER ET AL., supra note 22, at 2.
55 . Id . at 11.
56 . See Myrte Dierckx et al., Resilience in Families in Transition: What Happens When a
Parent Is Transgender?, 66 FAM. REL. 399, 399, 403, 408 (2017).
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ence their parent’s gender transition as a painful loss,” often due to the vari-
ous protective processes developed by the family, including family continuity
and communication, the acceptance of a partner, and reflection and analysis
from both the parent and child regarding the meaning of transition to set
them at greater ease.57 In every study that we found, the most dominant fac-
tor to impact the child’s well-being was not the transition itself, but rather
the “parental relationship and family constellation.”58
Third, the study finds that “[t]ransgender parents have reported dis-
crimination—either formally through the courts or informally by the
child(ren)’s other parent—in child custody and visitation arrangements.”59
The National Transgender Discrimination Survey, which is the largest study
of transgender people in the United States, found that 29% of transgender
parents faced an ex-spouse limiting their contact with their children.60 Sig-
nificantly, 13% of respondents reported that courts had also actively limited
their relationships with their children due to parental transgender status,
noting that respondents of color experienced “higher rates of court interven-
tion.”61 Of course, external factors, like culture, history, and economics, also
affect the relationships between transgender parents and their children,62 as
do the laws that exist to protect against discrimination on the basis of gender
identity. Although at latest count 20 states and more than 100 municipalities
in the United States have adopted explicit statutory protections against dis-
crimination based on gender identity, that is only a minority compared to
the rest of the nation.63 Further, transgender parents who are also of a racial
or ethnic minority face even more challenges, both from the surrounding so-
cial context as well as from the law.64 Class and economic opportunity con-
57 . Id . at 408; see also Stephen Erich et al., Family Relationships and Their Correlations
with Transsexual Well-Being, 4 J. GLBT FAM. STUD. 419, 430 (2008) (noting that transgender
individuals and their families are “able to develop, maintain, or reconceptualize their relation-
ships in a positive and supportive manner . . . and eventually reach a new level of adaptive bal-
ance”).
58. White & Ettner, Disclosure, supra note 43, at 139 (noting that the “parental relation-
ship and family constellation had significantly more bearing on the outcome of the children
than the transition itself”); see also STOTZER ET AL., supra note 22, at 10 (citing studies noting
that the main stressors for children were not about the gender transition alone, but rather
about the tension between the parents regarding the transition).
59. STOTZER ET AL., supra note 22, at 2.
60. GRANT ET AL., supra note 40, at 98; see also Green, supra note 43, at 1 (“Many [ex-
spouses] are so enraged at the transsexual parent that they defiantly oppose any contact with
the child.”).
61. Haines, supra note 17, at 239 (citing GRANT ET AL., supra note 40). One study from
Canada noted that a court had imposed particular conditions on a transgender mother, going
so far as to ban her from visiting her child’s school. STOTZER ET AL., supra note 22, at 14 (citing
PYNE, supra note 51).
62. Amanda Veldorale-Griffin, Transgender Parents and Their Adult Children’s Experi-
ences of Disclosure and Transition, 10 J. GLBT FAM. STUD. 475, 479 (2014).
63. 1 SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 13, at §§ 10:5, :7.
64 . See Veldorale-Griffin, supra note 62, at 479.
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tinue to challenge the well-being of transgender parents and their surround-
ing communities, limiting their opportunities to seek out psychological and
medical resources and support.65
Nevertheless, while these external factors impact the support
transgender parents receive, it is undeniable that more and more
transgender individuals are having babies and forming families. It is not dif-
ficult, therefore, to predict that such families will inevitably become seen as
an unremarkable part of the fabric of our society.66
B. Challenges to Parental Recognition Before Obergefell
Prior to nationwide marriage equality, a number of courts invalidated
the marriages of transgender people, leaving the fate of the children’s par-
entage in such cases open to further revision. In one example from this peri-
od, in a Maryland case a cisgender67 mother challenged a bid for shared
custody from her ex-spouse, a transgender man (Michael Conover, formerly
Michelle),68 arguing the following:
Should Michelle [sic] have her way with the court, she would have a court
order backed by the full powers of the court enabling her to walk down the
sidewalk to Jaxon’s home, knock on the door with police behind her, and
with court papers in hand announce that she is there for visitation with
Jaxon and take him off for overnight visitations . . . . Other parents will be
going home and having discussions behind closed doors. “Little pitchers
have big ears.” Other five year old children in his class are going to be pick-
ing up terms easier for them to say in the colloquial vernacular. The term
“transvestite” may be too long for them to say. We can almost guess at the
other terms they’ll hear their father or mother say.
Children can be cruel (they are not politically correct) and on the play-
ground and on the school bus they are going to taunt him “Your father’s a
65 . Id .; see also STOTZER ET AL., supra note 22, at 3 (noting that further study on a wide
number of variables—including the role of race, class, gender, age of transition, range of family
formation, genderqueer or nonbinary individuals, and the evolution of parent-child relation-
ships—is needed); Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and the Constitution of Family Status, 32
CONST. COMMENT. 377 (2017) (providing an excellent exploration of the role of intersectional-
ity in family law litigation).
66 . See Timothy F. Murphy, The Ethics of Helping Transgender Men and Women Have
Children, 53 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 46, 55 (2010) (noting that while it might be “tempting to
imagine lots of possible damaging social effects to children born of transgender men, just as
earlier it was easy to imagine lots of possible damaging social effects to children born to surro-
gate mothers, by IVF and ET, children born to unmarried or unpartnered women, and chil-
dren born to homosexual men and women,” the “knowable risks do not set this type of
parenting apart from all others”).
67. A cisgender person is someone whose sex assigned at birth is consistent with the
person’s gender identity.
68. Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433 (Md. 2016); Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Court of Special Appeals at 2 n.3, Conover, 146 A.3d 433 (No. 79), https://freestate-justice.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Conover-Petition-for-Certiorari.pdf [https://perma.cc/83A6-
QMUZ].
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_______. Ha Ha Ha.” They’ll sing it with a sing-song ring as children do.
They will bully him. Little children will think if his father is thus and so, he
must be one too. They’ll think it is somehow passed on. They will shun
him. . . . All in the name of “equality.”69
Thankfully, the high court ignored the mother’s deeply offensive and legally
irrelevant arguments about the potential risks to the child from having a
transgender man recognized as his father.70 Nonetheless, the mother’s argu-
ments demonstrate the ways that stereotypes and fears about transgender
parents can influence even cases involving what might seem to be purely le-
gal questions, such as whether or not the law will recognize an individual as
a parent when they lack a biological or adoptive relationship to a child they
helped raise.
Prior to Obergefell’s recognition of marriage equality nationwide, a
number of decisions invalidated marriages based on the transgender status
of one partner, often permanently altering the transgender parent’s relation-
ship to their child.71 In this set of cases, almost always involving transgender
men married to cisgender women, one spouse sought to invalidate the mar-
riage, in part in order to sever the parent–child relationship that would oth-
erwise automatically flow to a non-biological father for children born during
the marriage.72 The argument generally used was that a marriage between
two individuals with the same birth-assigned sex was an invalid same-sex
marriage. Since the marriage was invalid, the argument went, any parental
rights of the non-biological parent that were based in the presumption of pa-
ternity of children born to a spouse73 were invalid, as well.
Until Obergefell, such arguments were often successful; today, they are
no longer good law.74 Here, the reasoning was that a person could never
transition because of the presumed immutability of sex.75 In a perceptive ac-
count of these cases, Taylor Flynn asks,
69. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals at 2–3,
Conover, 146 A.3d 433 (No. 79), http://freestate-justice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
12/Conover-2015.10.28-Opp-to-Pet-for-Cert-for-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/H63L-EEGZ].
70 . Conover, 146 A.3d at 437 (holding that Michael, as a non-biological de facto parent,
has standing to seek custody and visitation).
71 . See, e .g ., Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), reh’g
denied (Sept. 29, 2004), cert denied, 898 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2005) (voiding a marriage between a
transgender man and his wife as not recognized under Florida law); In re Marriage of Sim-
mons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 307–09 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (voiding a marriage between a transgender
man and his wife as not recognized under Illinois law).
72. On rare occasions, a trans or same-sex parent has sought to disclaim a parental rela-
tionship to avoid responsibility for child support. See, e .g ., Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d
780 (Fam. Ct. 1985); Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005).
73 . See, e .g ., Nancy D. Polikoff, The New “Illegitimacy”: Winning Backward in the Pro-
tection of the Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 721, 739–40
(2012).
74 . See Elizabeth E. Monnin-Browder, Relationship Recognition and Protections, in
TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW, supra note 22, at 36, 41.
75 . Id . at 46.
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What if you were declared a “legal stranger” to your child and were prohib-
ited from ever seeing her again? What if you were told that your marriage
never existed, your name is not your own, or your sex is not what you know
it to be? These are the lived experiences of many transgender people who
walk into civil or family court every day.76
Many early cases appear to have taken this approach, a factor that suggests
that one of the great wins of Obergefell may be the removal of scrutiny re-
garding the marriages of transgender individuals.
In such cases, courts invalidated these marriages, either because the
court rejected the transition, or because the court substituted its judgment
for another state entity in concluding that the transition was somehow in-
complete. Consider the observations by a Texas appellate court that refused
to recognize the marriage between Christie Lee Littleton, a transgender wom-
an, and Jonathan Mark Littleton, a cisgender man:
The deeper philosophical (and now legal) question is: can a physician
change the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counseling, or is a
person’s gender immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?
. . . .
There are some things we cannot will into being. They just are.
. . . .
We hold, as a matter of law, that Christie Littleton is a male. As a male,
Christie cannot be married to another male.77
After Littleton, appellate courts in Kansas, Ohio, and New York ruled that
marriages involving transgender individuals were null and void.78
As a result, in some of these cases the transgender parent was cut off
from their children, sometimes permanently, and, in at least one case, even
after winning in the trial court. In Florida, for example, Michael Kantaras, a
transgender man, faced a custody battle regarding his children (who were
biologically fathered by Michael’s brother).79 In the lower court, Kantaras
won a three-week trial that focused, in part, on his role as a parent.80 In that
case, the trial court had made extensive findings supporting the conclusion
that Michael is male, noting that he had a driver’s license and birth certifi-
cate that recognized him as male and had participated in adoption proceed-
ings and childrearing as a father.81
Yet despite the weight of this evidence, the appeals court reversed the
lower court’s decision. The appellate opinion cited courts in Ohio, Kansas,
76. Flynn, supra note 22, at 32.
77. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 224, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).
78. Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
79 . Id . at 156.
80 . See id .
81 . Id .
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Texas, and New York, all of which invalidated marriages between a
transgender person and a cisgender spouse on the grounds that the marriag-
es violated state statutes or public policy.82 Quoting the Kansas Supreme
Court, it observed:
The words “sex,” “male,” and “female” in everyday understanding do
not encompass transsexuals. The plain, ordinary meaning of “persons of
the opposite sex” contemplates a biological man and a biological woman
and not persons who are experiencing gender dysphoria. A male-to-female
post-operative transsexual does not fit the definition of a female . . . . [T]he
transsexual still “inhabits . . . a male body in all aspects other than what the
physicians have supplied.”83
Since the marriage was no longer valid, the court remanded for a determina-
tion of the legal status of the children after the annulment was completed.84
Other transgender parents faced similar challenges.85 Interestingly,
many of these cases emerged around the same time that the nation began to
confront the emergence of legalized same-sex marriage.86 Some courts inval-
idated marriages, not because a person could never transition, but because
the court concluded that the individual had not “successfully” transitioned.87
82 . Id . at 158–61; see also In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135, 137 (Kan. 2002),
cert . denied, 537 U.S. 825 (2002) (voiding marriage because transgender woman did not “fit the
definition of a female” without female reproductive capacity and chromosomal expression);
Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 716–17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (annulling marriage of
transgender man based on public policy that marriage is “for the purpose of begetting off-
spring”); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500–01 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (invalidating
marriage based on interpretation of New York statutes); In re Marriage License for Nash, No.
2002-T-0149, 2003 WL 23097095, at *1, *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003) (following Ladrach
and denying marriage license issuance to cisgender woman and transgender man); In re Lad-
rach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987) (denying issuance of marriage license to
transgender woman and cisgender man and stating the state legislature can “change the stat-
utes” if such issuance “is to be the public policy of the state”); Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231 (invali-
dating marriage because “as a matter of law, [a transgender woman] is a male” and “cannot be
married to another male” based on interpretation of Texas statutes).
83 . Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 159 (quoting In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135). Such
decisions, Flynn writes, reflect an “almost fetishistic attitude toward trans individuals, evident
in the courts’ reductionist tendency to replace substantive analysis (whether Michael is a good
parent) with a relentless focus on sexual anatomy (whether Michael has a penis).” Flynn, supra
note 22, at 33 (noting that “courts simultaneously ‘de-sex’ and hypersexualize trans men and
women”).
84 . Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 161. The custody case between Michael Kantaras and his
former wife ultimately settled. Emanuella Grinberg, Settlement Reached in Transsexual Custody
Case, CNN (June 16, 2005, 2:17 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2005/LAW/06/16/
ctv.transsexual.custody/ [https://perma.cc/95RE-WKFR].
85 . See In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 307–09 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Mon-
nin-Browder, supra note 74, at 47–48 (discussing case).
86. We are grateful to Shannon Minter for this point.
87 . See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 136 (invalidating marriage on the grounds
that “transsexuals are not included” in the statutes requiring marriage to be of members of the
opposite sex); Monnin-Browder, supra note 74, at 48 (discussing Simmons).
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In one case from Illinois, In re Marriage of Simmons, even though a
transgender father had obtained an amended birth certificate, the trial court
found that the marriage was still invalid because he had not “completed” sex
reassignment surgery.88 When the transgender parent argued that his
amended birth certificate essentially removed an impediment to the mar-
riage’s recognition, the court disagreed, noting that “he still possesses all of
his external female genitalia and requires additional surgeries before sex re-
assignment can be considered completed.”89 It rejected the new birth certifi-
cate as “ministerial,” and refused to extend the Parentage Act to cover him
because it did not extend to same-sex parents.90
In a particularly devastating move, the court denied standing to the par-
ent even though the child had always known him as “Daddy.”91 In his final
conclusion, the judge stated that “[i]t would be illogical to hold that because
petitioner and respondent agreed to enter into a marriage prohibited under
Illinois law, the state is now obliged to recognize that illegal union and all
that flows therefrom simply because respondent participated and acquiesced
in it.”92 Here, the judge made little or no effort to grapple with the signifi-
cance of the court’s holding, which immediately divested a child from his
parent.93
In similar cases, where the state had not set forth specific procedures for
recognizing a gender transition, courts concluded that there was no authori-
ty to recognize the marriage and, therefore, no basis to find a legal parent–
child relationship between the child and the transgender father.94 In some
cases, as in Simmons, courts reached this conclusion even when the
transgender parent had obtained a birth certificate recognizing their transi-
tion. In others, if the state did not set forth guidelines to recognize a person’s
transition, then the court would automatically invalidate the marriage. In
one case demonstrating this outcome, In re Ladrach, an Ohio court opined
that “if a state permits such a change of sex on the birth certificate of a post-
operative transsexual, either by statute or administrative ruling, then a mar-
riage license . . . must issue.”95 However, since Ohio did not permit
transgender people to change their birth certificates, the Ladrach court re-
fused to issue a marriage license, even after the transgender person had un-
dergone gender confirmation surgery.96
88. 825 N.E.2d at 308.
89 . In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 309–10.
90 . Id . at 310–11.
91 . Id . at 312.
92 . Id . at 314.
93 . Id . at 315.
94 . See Monnin-Browder, supra note 74, at 49 (discussing In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d
828, 831–32 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987)).
95. 513 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987).
96 . In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 831.
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Eventually, where states had formalized a procedure to change the gen-
der marker on a birth certificate, courts began to recognize marriages, so
long as the transgender person transitioned prior to the marriage.97 For ex-
ample, in a New Jersey opinion, M .T . v . J .T ., a state appellate court recog-
nized a transgender woman’s marriage to a man, reasoning that a
determination of one’s sex required consideration of a variety of factors, in-
cluding her “self-image, the deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual
identity and character.”98 The appellate court observed that “for marital pur-
poses if the anatomical or genital features of a genuine transsexual are made
to conform to the person’s gender, psyche or psychological sex, then identity
by sex must be governed by the congruence of these standards.”99 Other
courts suggested that the issues of transition were not necessarily controlling
when the court was willing to consider alternative theories, such as estoppel,
to maintain some relationship between a child and an adult who had acted as
a parent.100
While a step up from denying recognition altogether, requiring proof of
medical transition excludes many transgender individuals who may not seek
to undergo particular treatments or who for other reasons cannot access
them. Fortunately, as noted above, states are moving more and more toward
systems of gender recognition that do not rely on surgery or any other medi-
cal treatment.101 Instead, legal regimes are increasingly recognizing that an
individual’s gender is defined by the person’s gender identity alone.102 That
change, combined with the legal irrelevance of gender to marriage post-
Obergefell, means that the government may eventually be able to cease regu-
lating gender altogether.
II. TRANSGENDER PARENTS AND CONTESTED CHILD CUSTODY CASES: A
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Today, since Obergefell, while trans individuals no longer face the same
risk of outright invalidation of their families, they continue to face the risk of
biased treatment by the courts in decisions regarding the allocation of physi-
97 . See Miller v. Angel, Civ. No. GD053180 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2014),
http://transgenderlawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/millerorder.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EA5G-RGKW]; Monnin-Browder, supra note 74, at 43–46 (citing the Cali-
fornia court ruling discussed in Greg Hernandez, Judge Rules Transsexual in Custody Case Is
Male, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 26, 1997), http://articles.latimes.com/1997/nov/26/news/mn-57925
[https://perma.cc/JJ9K-QY7K]).
98. 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Monnin-Browder, supra note 74,
at 43–44.
99 . M .T ., 355 A.2d at 209.
100 . See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 26, at § 7:5.
101 . See, e .g ., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103426 (West Supp. 2019) (allowing a
transgender person to update the gender marker on a birth certificate by submitting an affida-
vit confirming that the change would reflect the person’s gender identity).
102 . See Levasseur, supra note 27, at 990.
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cal custody, decisionmaking, and visitation between a child’s parents.103 As
this Part shows, while the law has evolved in treating lesbian, bisexual, and
gay parents more equally in these family court determinations, it has not
evolved as far where transgender parents are involved.104
A. Overview of Child Custody Decisionmaking Standards
Courts and legislatures today generally recognize that, following a di-
vorce, the maintenance of parent–child bonds and frequent contact with
both parents is presumptively in a child’s best interest.105 This is supported
by social science evidence indicating that losing contact with a parent is the
most painful effect of divorce for a child and that frequent and quality visita-
tion with a nonresident parent has a significant protective benefit.106 Courts
will therefore only deny visitation or impose restrictions (such as requiring
supervision) in exceptional circumstances that endanger the child.107 Re-
moval of a child by the state or termination of parental status is an even
more drastic and disfavored act that generally requires “clear and convincing
evidence” that a parent is unfit and that the child will be harmed if returned
to the home, as well as a finding that the termination of the relationship is in
the child’s best interest.108
When determining how to apportion residential time (“physical” custo-
dy) and decisionmaking authority (“legal” custody) between two recognized
103. For transgender (and non-transgender) parents who are not biologically connected
to their children, the risk of invalidation may still be very real. See generally Douglas NeJaime,
The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260 (2017) (noting how biological connection an-
chors nonmarital parenthood, at the cost of other forms of parental recognition).
104 . See generally Marie-Amélie George, The LGBT Disconnect: Politics and Perils of Le-
gal Movement Formation, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 503 (providing an excellent account of how na-
tional, mainstream LGBT rights organizations, by pursuing an assimilationist agenda, have
also failed to prioritize the issues faced by transgender individuals, making them more vulner-
able as a result).
105 . See, e .g ., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020(b) (West Supp. 2019) (declaring “that it is the pub-
lic policy of this state to ensure that children have frequent and continuing contact with both
parents”).
106. Joan B. Kelly & Robert E. Emery, Children’s Adjustment Following Divorce: Risk and
Resilience Perspectives, 52 FAM. REL. 352, 354, 356 (2003).
107 . See, e .g ., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-129(1)(b)(I) (West 2018) (“The court shall
not restrict a parent’s parenting time rights unless it finds that the parenting time would en-
danger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional development.”);
Dehlman v. White, 602 N.Y.S.2d 435, 436 (App. Div. 1993) (“Absent exceptional circumstanc-
es, a parent may not be deprived of his or her natural right to meaningful visitation with a
child.”). Such a denial would also have constitutional implications. See, e .g ., In re Marriage of
Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 333 (Colo. App. 2007) (holding that a trial court cannot deny a parent
visitation without expressly considering whether that is “the least detrimental alternative,” be-
cause such a denial would infringe “a parent’s fundamental, constitutional right to maintain a
relationship with his or her children”).
108. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982) (holding that due process requires
high bar of “clear and convincing evidence” of unfitness before parent’s rights can be terminat-
ed).
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legal parents, courts today are generally guided by the standard known as
“the best interest of the child.”109 The best interest test became formalized in
American law relatively recently, in the latter third of the twentieth centu-
ry.110 Before that time, an evolving series of rules and presumptions guided
the placement of children following a divorce.111 In the English common law,
until at least the nineteenth century, the father was entitled to automatic cus-
tody of children in recognition of his property rights over them, although
this rule was less absolute in the United States.112 By the early twentieth cen-
tury that principle had given way to a popular recognition that, particularly
in a child’s youngest, or “tender,” years, the mother should retain custody.113
By the 1960s, however, with the rise of women’s liberation, courts began
to conclude that the presumption of maternal custody was overly restrictive
and did not always lead to the most desirable or most equitable outcome.114
But no new candidate for a simple presumption or rule took its place. In-
stead, courts and then legislatures turned to the open-ended standard requir-
ing courts to make an individualized determination of what custodial
arrangement would be in the best interest of this particular child.115
The best interest standard has now been adopted by statute in every
state.116 But despite its dominance, the best interest standard has faced heavy
criticism from legal scholars, psychologists, and others for offering judges
breathtakingly wide discretion, unparalleled in almost any other area of
109. This broad discretionary standard is not usually used, however, in cases that do not
involve a legal parent, such as petitions for visitation or custody by grandparents or by other
third parties not recognized as a legal parent. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72–73 (2000)
(plurality opinion) (holding unconstitutional a Washington statute permitting courts to order
grandparent visitation against the wishes of the parents where such visitation would be in the
best interest of the child).
110 . See Annual Review Article, Child Custody, Visitation, & Termination of Parental
Rights, 16 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 41, 47–50 (2015) (listing several state laws from the late twenti-
eth century establishing the standard of best interest of the child).
111 . See generally MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES (1994) (detailing the history
of American law relating to child custody from the colonial era to the end of the twentieth cen-
tury); Annual Review Article, supra note 110, at 44–50.
112. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226, 233–35.
113 . Id . at 235.
114 . Id .
115. Until the last few decades, courts almost always awarded only one parent as the cus-
todian, leaving the other parent with only occasional visitation. The strong trend today, how-
ever, is a preference for joint legal and physical custody, under which parents are encouraged
to work with the court to devise a “parenting plan” that divides up decisionmaking and parent-
ing time based on the unique needs of the family. See, e .g ., J. Herbie DiFonzo, From the Rule of
One to Shared Parenting: Custody Presumptions in Law and Policy, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 215–
16, 226 (2014).
116 . See Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 113, 117 n.19 (2009) (listing statutes).
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law.117 One critique is that the limited resources of the family courts cannot
possibly allow judges to accurately understand or predict the future implica-
tions for children of various custodial arrangements.118 Another is that it in-
cludes no room for considerations of fairness or the rights of parents.119
The best interest standard has also been criticized for its indeterminacy,
as it leaves judges to decide between opposing child-rearing approaches, re-
ligious beliefs, or value systems without adequate guideposts from either law
or societal consensus.120 That indeterminacy also creates incentives for par-
ties to litigate instead of negotiate agreements and allows a party to manipu-
late the system; for instance, a parent might ask for more custody than they
really want in an attempt to convince the other parent to trade away money
for parenting time or decisionmaking authority.121
In response to these criticisms, some limitations have been put in place
to attempt to narrow and channel judges’ discretion. The Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act (UMDA), issued in 1970 and amended in 1971 and 1973,
provides a good example of the broad range of factors courts are typically
directed to consider as part of the best interest standard.122 It instructs courts
117 . See, e .g ., Mnookin, supra note 112, at 289. For more commentary on the best inter-
ests test, see CHILDREN’S BUREAU, DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 2 (2016),
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/best_interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZM4-RC8L]; Mar-
garet F. Brinig, Does Parental Autonomy Require Equal Custody at Divorce?, 65 LA. L. REV.
1345 (2005); Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fic-
tions, 5 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 267 (1987); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best
Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11 (1987); Robert E. Emery, Rule or Rorschach? Ap-
proximating Children’s Best Interests, 2 CHILD DEV. PERSP. 132 (2007); Elizabeth S. Scott &
Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody: The Puzzling Persistence of the Best-
Interests Standard, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014, at 69, 69–70 (2014) (characterizing in-
determinacy as one of the deficiencies of the best interests standard); and Raymie H. Wayne,
The Best Interests of the Child: A Silent Standard—Will You Know It When You Hear It?, 2 J.
PUB. CHILD WELFARE 33 (2008). But see Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child
Custody and the UMDA’s Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215, 2244 (1991) (defend-
ing discretion).
118 . See, e .g ., Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988); Daniel W. Shuman,
What Should We Permit Mental Health Professionals to Say About “The Best Interests of the
Child”?: An Essay on Common Sense, Daubert, and the Rules of Evidence, 31 FAM. L.Q. 551,
565–69 (1997).
119 . See, e .g ., Scott Altman, Should Child Custody Rules Be Fair?, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J.
FAM. L. 325, 353 (1996–1997); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81
VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995).
120 . See, e .g ., Elster, supra note 117.
121 . See, e .g ., Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360–62 (W. Va. 1981); Mary Ann Glen-
don, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L.
REV. 1165, 1181 (1986); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
122. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973); see Schneider,
supra note 117, at 2216 (“Although the UMDA has not been widely adopted, its child custody
provisions reflected, and to an important degree continues to reflect, standard American
law.”).
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to “determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child.”123 In
so doing, the court must “consider all relevant factors including” the parents’
wishes, the child’s wishes, the child’s relationship with their parents, siblings,
home, and community, and the parents’ mental and physical health.124 The
UMDA puts only one express limitation on that broad discretion: “The court
shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his
relationship to the child.”125
Nearly thirty years later, there was another attempt at promulgating
model rules for family law. In 2000, the American Law Institute, which pub-
lishes influential restatements of the law in various subject areas, issued its
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution.126 The Principles attempt to
simplify the determination of custody and visitation by moving away from
the open-ended best interest standard to more concrete rules, including the
“approximation” standard, which aims to have custody arrangements mirror
the proportion of time each parent spent caring for the child prior to the di-
vorce.127
Neither the ALI Principles nor the UMDA have been broadly adopted
by courts or state legislatures, however. Only eight states have adopted por-
tions of the UMDA,128 and only one state, West Virginia, has adopted the
ALI’s approximation standard for custody.129
Today nearly all states limit judges’ discretion by listing statutory factors
that must be considered in assessing a child’s best interest: past, present, and
future circumstances; the interaction and relationship between parent and
child; and other factors such as their location, adjustment, and mental and
physical health.130 Even with guideposts in place, however, judicial discretion
123. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402.
124 . Id.
125 . Id .
126. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 (AM. LAW INST. 2002).
127 . See Richard A. Warshak, Parenting by the Clock: The Best-Interest-of-the-Child
Standard, Judicial Discretion, and the American Law Institute’s “Approximation Rule,” 41 U.
BALT. L. REV. 83 (2011).
128. Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child
Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q. 381, 394 (2008).
129. ANN HARALAMBIE, 1 HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION CASES
§ 4.3 n.18 (3d ed. 2018) (noting that “[a] number of appellate decisions refer to the ALI Princi-
ples, but few have specifically adopted any portions of them”); Michael R. Clisham & Robin
Fretwell Wilson, American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Eight
Years After Adoption: Guiding Principles or Obligatory Footnote?, 42 FAM. L.Q. 573, 576 (2008).
130. Those factors may include:
(1) The past, present, and potential future relationship between the parent and the
child; (2) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parent
or parents, the child’s siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect
the child’s best interest; (3) The child’s adjustment to home, school, and commu-
nity; (4) If the child is of suitable age and maturity, and the wishes of the child as
to legal decision-making and parenting time; (5) The mental and physical health
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to interpret the child’s best interest remains staggeringly broad, as nearly
every statute includes a catchall instruction to courts to consider any other
factor “having a reasonable bearing on the physical and psychological well-
being of the child.”131
B. Legal Relevance of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Custody
Determinations
Within the broader context of the development of custody law, the rules
courts apply to consider whether lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender par-
ents can be granted custody or visitation have also evolved over the past half
century. Until the 1970s, most courts applied a blanket, per se rule against
allowing children to live with or spend time with an LBGT parent.132 Under
a similar justification, parents (especially mothers) who engaged in extra-
marital sexual conduct were also typically barred from having custody.133 It
was widely accepted that association with such a person would by definition
have a detrimental impact on a child.
After Stonewall and the rise of the gay rights movement, as societal atti-
tudes toward homosexuality began to change, courts began to renounce the
per se prohibition on custody or visitation. In its place, courts adopted a
more nuanced “nexus” or “adverse interest” test that required demonstration
(or at least recitation) of a link to specific harms that could result from con-
tact with an LGBT parent.134 Rather than disqualifying an LGBT parent out-
of all individuals involved; and (6) Which parent is more likely to allow the child
frequent, meaningful and continuing contact with the other parent.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(A) (2017); see also LINDA D. ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4.3 (2019).
131. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19–A, § 1653(3)(N) (Supp. 2018); see also Blew v. Verta,
617 A.2d 31, 35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (declaring that the best interest standard “requires us to
consider the full panoply of a child’s physical, emotional, and spiritual well-being”).
132 . See, e .g ., Nadler v. Superior Court ex rel . County of Sacramento, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352
(Ct. App. 1967) (reversing lower court that had denied custody to lesbian mother finding her
unfit “as a matter of law”). Note that some commentators have further broken down the “per
se” test into more than one category: for example, an irrebuttable presumption of unfitness and
a rebuttable presumption of unfitness. Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Fails
Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623, 639–41 (1996) (noting that some
appellate decisions often cited as examples of a per se test actually applied a broadly deferential
standard of review that permitted, but did not require, trial courts to deny custody to lesbian or
gay parents for any reason or no reason at all); see also Robert A. Beargie, Commentary, Custo-
dy Determinations Involving the Homosexual Parent, 22 FAM. L.Q. 71 (1988); Nan D. Hunter &
Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25
BUFF L. REV. 691 (1976); Katheryn D. Katz, Majoritarian Morality and Parental Rights, 52 ALB.
L. REV. 405, 447–48 (1988).
133 . See Suzanne A. Kim, The Neutered Parent, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 10–11 (2012).
134. JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 26, at § 1:1; Shapiro, supra note 132, at 635–37; Kenji
Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 858–59 (2002). For more discussion on the nexus test
and LGB parenting, see Kim H. Pearson, Sexuality in Child Custody Decisions, 50 FAM. CT.
REV. 280, 284–86 (2012); Annual Review Article, supra note 110, at 56–57; Heather J. Lange-
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right, a court would instead have to identify a nexus between the parent’s
identity or conduct and a harmful effect on the child. That shift came about,
in part, due to calls from LGBT advocates for a rule grounded more in reality
than in stereotypes.135
Although states use varying formulations, a representative statement of
the nexus test comes from an Alaska Supreme Court decision in 1985, re-
versing a custody decision that was based on the mother’s homosexuality:
We have often endorsed the requirement that there be a nexus between the
conduct of the parent relied on by the court and the parent-child relation-
ship.
For example, that a mother is living with another man in an adulterous re-
lationship does not justify denying her custody absent any indication of ad-
verse effects on the child. Nor does bearing children out of wedlock or
instability in relationships warrant a custody change where the parent’s
conduct does not adversely affect the child or the mother’s parenting abili-
ties. Even the mental health of the custodial parent is “relevant only insofar
as it has or can be expected to negatively affect the child.”136
Or as Maryland’s highest court held in 1998, in a case involving a gay
parent, “[t]he only relevance that a parent’s sexual conduct or lifestyle has in
the context of a visitation proceeding of this type is where that conduct or
lifestyle is clearly shown to be detrimental to the children’s emotional and/or
physical well-being.”137
Many states have codified some version of the nexus test. For example,
Kentucky’s child custody statute instructs courts to consider “all relevant fac-
tors” in weighing the best interest of the child, and it sets forth a variety of
factors that courts must consider, including the child’s wishes; the relation-
ship of the child to each of the parties; the child’s adjustment to home,
school, and community; and the mental and physical health of all the par-
mak, Comment, The “Best Interest of the Child”: Is a Categorical Ban on Homosexual Adoption
an Appropriate Means to This End?, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 825, 842 (2000); and Steve Susoeff,
Comment, Assessing Children’s Best Interests When a Parent Is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Ra-
tional Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852, 858 (1985).
135. JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 26, at § 1:1 (“Fortunately, however, courts in the vast ma-
jority of states today apply the nexus or ‘adverse impact’ rule, under which a parent’s sexual
orientation cannot be taken into account in making a custody or visitation determination un-
less the parent’s sexual orientation has directly harmed the child.”); Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody
Rights of Lesbian and Gay Parents Redux: The Irrelevance of Constitutional Principles, 60 UCLA
L. REV. DISCOURSE 226, 237 n.82 (2013) (“[C]ourts . . . ought to rule that, until and unless a
nexus is established between lesbianism and its effect on the child, the mother’s sexual activity
shall be irrelevant. The nexus itself must be factually specific and concrete. The evidence re-
quired to support such a connection must be definite and relevant to the individuals involved.
Speculation should not suffice.” (quoting Hunter & Polikoff, supra note 132, at 714–15)).
136. S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 878 (Alaska 1985) (citations omitted) (quoting Morel
v. Morel, 647 P.2d 605, 608 (Alaska 1982)).
137. Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662, 678 (Md. 1998).
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ties.138 Until July 14, 2018, the statute also specifically carved out a nexus-
type exception to the court’s broad discretion: “The court shall not consider
conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to the
child.”139 The Kentucky Court of Appeals relied on that provision in 2012 to
overturn a family court’s assumption that a mother’s same-sex relationship
was per se harmful to the children, holding that the statute “does not allow
sexual orientation to be a determining factor unless there is a direct negative
impact on the children.”140
Washington, D.C. is so far the only jurisdiction to codify a version of the
nexus test that specifically limits a court’s ability to consider a parent’s LGB
or trans status: “In any proceeding between parents in which the custody of a
child is raised as an issue, the . . . . race, color, national origin, political affilia-
tion, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression of a party, in
and of itself, shall not be a conclusive consideration.”141 Note that the statute
does not prohibit all consideration of gender identity or expression, only
consideration of that characteristic to the exclusion of all other relevant
characteristics, which would amount to a per se ban.
Courts have similarly moved away from per se bans and adopted nexus
tests to restrict judicial discretion in cases involving other parental character-
istics that could inadvertently be influenced by bias, such as race,142 adul-
tery,143 nonmarital sexual relationships,144 polyamory,145 religion,146 HIV
138. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2) (LexisNexis 2018).
139. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(3) (LexisNexis 2004), amended by KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 403.270 (LexisNexis 2018).
140. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 382 S.W.3d 892, 898 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).
141. D.C. CODE § 16-914(a)(1)(A) (2001); see also Shapiro, supra note 132, at 635–36
n.67.
142. Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Palmore v . Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984),
which disallowed race as a consideration in custody cases on constitutional grounds, courts
had begun to make the same shift in considering the placement of mixed-race children under
the best interest standard. Compare Ward v. Ward, 216 P.2d 755, 756 (Wash. 1950) (upholding
trial court decision granting custody of mixed-race children to black father because “[t]hey will
have a much better opportunity to take their rightful place in society if they are brought up
among their own people”), with Fountaine v. Fountaine, 133 N.E.2d 532, 534–35 (Ill. App. Ct.
1956) (holding that while a court should consider “all relevant considerations” relating to the
children’s best interests, “the question of race alone can[not] overweigh all other considera-
tions and be decisive of the question”).
143. Davis v. Davis, 372 A.2d 231, 235 (Md. 1977) (noting that adultery may be a relevant
consideration “only insofar as it affects the child’s welfare”).
144 . In re Custody of Temos, 450 A.2d 111, 122 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (holding that a
court must determine effect of a nonmarital relationship on the children).
145 . In re R.E., 775 S.E.2d 542, 546 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015); V.B. v. J.E.B., 55 A.3d 1193, 1202
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (finding the trial court erred in placing undue weight on the father’s poly-
amory).
146. Pater v. Pater, 588 N.E.2d 794, 800 (Ohio 1992) (holding a court cannot deny custo-
dy due to religious practices unless there is “evidence that those practices will adversely affect
the mental or physical health of the child”).
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status,147 age,148 and disability.149 In each of those areas, courts have recog-
nized that a case-by-case evaluation is more likely to protect the best interest
of the child than a blanket ban based on the parent’s status.
For example, in one of the earliest cases to reject the per se rule that a gay
parent is unfit, a California court of appeals in 1967 overturned a trial court’s
decision to remove a child from the custody of her lesbian mother.150 The
lower court had based its decision solely on its finding that “[t]he Plaintiff is
a homosexual female engaging in sexual acts with other females,” which it
held “as a matter of law constitutes her not a fit or proper person” to have
custody.151 The appeals court remanded, holding that the judge had erred in
not even considering any other evidence of the child’s best interest.152
Although the nexus was undoubtedly an improvement on a per se ban, it
has its problems as well. The problem with the nexus test, as we outline fur-
ther below, is that harm is often in the eye of the beholder. That is, courts
applying the nexus test often consider evidence of harm that is minimal, hy-
pothesized, or purely imaginary.153 For example, a 1987 Missouri decision
claimed to apply the nexus test in a custody case involving a lesbian mother,
noting that “[t]here must be a nexus between harm to the child and the par-
ent’s homosexuality.”154 Nonetheless, the court found that allowing the lesbi-
an mother to retain custody would necessarily harm the children.155 The
court cited examples including the fact that the mother and her partner
“show affection toward one another in front of the children” and “sleep to-
gether in the same bed at the family home,” creating “an unhealthy envi-
ronment for minor children” that could affect their moral development.156
The court also cited the “peer pressure, teasing, and possible ostracizing they
may encounter as a result of the ‘alternative life style’ their mother has cho-
sen.”157 Upon closer inspection, every one of those considerations is simply a
stand-in for the mother’s sexual orientation.158 It is thus clear that the broad
147. North v. North, 648 A.2d 1025, 1030–31 n.2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (holding that
the father’s HIV-positive status could not be used as a factor to restrict overnight visitation
“unless the court finds that visitation without that restriction might endanger the child’s physi-
cal health or impair his or her emotional development”).
148. Collins v. Collins, 497 N.Y.S.2d 544 (App. Div. 1985).
149 . In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 44–45 (Cal. 1979).
150. Nadler v. Superior Court ex rel . County of Sacramento, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (Ct. App.
1967).
151 . Id . at 353.
152 . Id . at 354
153. Shapiro, supra note 132, at 641–46.
154. S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
155 . Id .
156 . Id .
157 . Id .
158 . See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 689 (2010) (rejecting distinction between prohibiting same-sex con-
duct and discriminating against gay people); Stockman v. Trump, 331 F. Supp. 3d 990, 998–
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best interest of the child test, even modified by the nexus requirement, is ca-
pable of being abused to justify a bias-driven outcome.
C. Transgender Parenting and Judicial Bias: The Daly Case
The best interest test can also be used to justify bias-driven outcomes for
transgender parents. As we discuss further in Part III, in the past, several
courts had held that a parent’s decision to transition justified a per se termi-
nation of the transgender parent’s legal rights as a parent.159 In these deci-
sions, the interest in the preservation of family bonds is subordinated to an
overwhelming fear of the transgender parent’s difference and an accompany-
ing determination to “protect” the child by isolating them from the danger
assumed to be posed by a transitioning parent. The “best interest of the
child,” so misconstrued, takes precedence over the interest of the child in
maintaining relationships with existing caregivers and entirely subsumes any
interests of the transgender parent, which are often absent from the analysis.
Consider the example below, which is one of the more well-known cases
that involved a transgender parent.160 In 1969, Suzanne Daly (then known as
Tim) and Nan Toews were married.161 Their daughter, Mary, was born four
years later.162 They divorced about twelve years later, and Nan took custody
of Mary in Reno, Nevada. Suzanne (then Tim) moved to Berkeley, Califor-
nia, to begin work at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, all the
while continuing to pay child support and alimony.163
Suzanne had known for many years that she was a woman,164 and she
began to take steps to undergo her transition to Suzanne shortly after her di-
vorce, when her daughter was about eight years old.165 To prepare her
daughter for the transition, while Mary was visiting, Suzanne explained that
she would be undergoing a gender transition under the care of medical pro-
fessionals, and requested that Mary avoid telling her mother or maternal
grandmother about the transition.166
1000 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (barring from military service only transgender people who seek to tran-
sition is the same thing as barring all transgender people).
159 . See Minter, supra note 22, at 413 & 421 n.15 (citing Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56 (Nev.
1986); then citing Cisek v. Cisek, No. 80 C.A. 113, 1982 WL 6161 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20,
1982); and then citing M.B. v. D.W, 236 S.W.3d 31 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007)).
160. For compelling analysis of the Daly case and related issues regarding transgender
parents, see BALL, supra note 22, and Flynn, supra note 22. Also see Nancy Polikoff’s excellent
rewrite of the Daly case in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FAMILY LAW OPINIONS REWRITTEN (forth-
coming) (draft on file with authors).
161. Dennis McBride, Stripped Rights: How Nevada Helped Destroy a Family, RENO
NEWS & REV. (July 13, 2017), https://www.newsreview.com/reno/stripped-rights/
content?oid=24641178 [https://perma.cc/2EDG-2H9A].
162 . Id .
163 . Id .
164 . Id .
165. Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 57 (Nev. 1986).
166 . Id .
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Indeed, the reason why Mary was asked to keep quiet about Suzanne’s
transition was because she worried (correctly, it turned out) that Nan would
use the information against Suzanne.167 When Mary returned back to Nan’s
house, she allegedly became withdrawn and finally admitted the news of the
transition to Nan.168 Nan then took the child to a psychologist, who, in the
words of the court, “advised respondent that it was very dangerous to allow
Mary to be in the company of her father again.”169
Nan immediately sought an order from the court terminating Suzanne’s
parental rights.170 In the words of Dennis McBride, one journalist who cov-
ered the case, Nan “did not want simply to end Suzanne’s visiting privileges
but to sunder her legal identity as Mary’s natural parent.”171 As Suzanne un-
derwent her transition, changing her name and obtaining gender confirma-
tion surgery, Suzanne’s ex-wife sought—and was granted—a restraining
order to prevent Suzanne from contacting her daughter during the termina-
tion proceedings.172
Suzanne, for her part, sought legal representation to protect her parental
interests, but she had a difficult time finding anyone to represent her.173
Eventually she found representation from a lawyer who was herself
transgender and who was able to marshal a strong degree of evidence of Su-
zanne’s fitness as a parent to address concerns about her transgender identi-
ty and her relationship to Mary.174 While one of their experts recognized that
there was almost no research to address the effect of a parent’s transition on
a child, he stated that
[i]f the child has felt himself to be loved by this person I think he can accept
the rather traumatic transformation, as long as he feels that he will contin-
ue to get love and support from his biological parent. . . . The concern and
caring of a parent isn’t totally tied up with the individual gender identity.175
167 . Id . at 61–62 (Gunderson, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that the biological
mother had, at one point, unilaterally decided to cut Suzanne off from seeing Mary, even lying
about the existence of a court order in asking two sheriff’s deputies to deter her from seeing her
daughter. Id . Suzanne was also threatened by Mary’s grandmother, who was wielding a gun. Id .
at 62.
168 . Id . at 57 (majority opinion).
169 . Id .
170 . See id .
171. McBride, supra note 161.
172 . Id .
173. When she tried to hire the same lawyers who represented her during her divorce, for
example, they refused when they found out she had transitioned. Id .
174 . Id .
175 . Id . At trial, others testified about Mary’s obvious love for Suzanne, noting that Mary
was wise beyond her nine years, had attended meetings with Suzanne at the Pacific Center
where she got support, and had initially readily accepted the fact of Suzanne’s transition. Id .
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Unfortunately, despite the best efforts of Suzanne’s lawyers, the testimo-
ny from the other side was dramatically slanted in the opposite direction. As
a news article recounted:
Nan Daly and her lawyer, Nada Novakovich, however, turned the hearings
into a seething circus of hatred, racism, AIDS panic, homophobic bigotry,
and personal harassment of those involved in Suzanne’s defense. Novako-
vich, a former Democratic U.S. House candidate, persistently referred to
Suzanne Daly in the masculine, suggested sexual impropriety between her
and Mary, and claimed that merely taking Mary to meetings at the Pacific
Center [a center supporting LGBT individuals] constituted physical endan-
germent “because of a disease that is prevalent in this type of community.”
Mary, Novakovich said, was “a gifted child with a brilliant future ahead of
her. Shall we keep her that way or shall we take a risk and put her in an en-
vironment of lesbians, gays, homosexuals, transsexuals, and perverts?”176
In an ironic twist, Novakovich was able to convince the court that any
therapy to help Mary understand Suzanne’s transition was both risky and
dangerous to Mary, because Mary was “normal” and from “a small town like
Reno,” unlike San Francisco where “[h]omosexuals and transsexuals and all
the perverts are more accepted.”177
For her part, Nan, too, fanned the flames of prejudice, noting,
I can’t accept that individual sitting there as my ex-husband. [C]an
[Mary’s] father take her to Father’s Day at Girl Scouts? . . . Does she have to
address him as mother? And, if so, what does that make me? . . . I don’t
move in circles where people are anything other than what they prove to be
in their appearance.178
Two months later, the judge permanently terminated Suzanne’s parental
rights.179 Although Suzanne appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada,180 the
court upheld the termination, 3–2. At the hearing, one of the justices asked,
“What’s Mary gonna call Tim? . . . Daddy? Mama the Second? I have five
children, [and] it’s just very, very difficult for me to understand how a father
could do that with a child.”181 Other justices, however, were more compas-
sionate. “It isn’t only a choice, is it?” Justice Springer said.182 “I can see where
somebody medically might have to undergo this sort of operation. But does
that necessarily mean that you’re ipso facto immoral or depraved?”183
In its written decision, the Nevada Supreme Court cited the testimony of
a psychologist who testified that there was a serious risk of emotional and
176 . Id .
177 . Id .
178 . Id .
179 . Id .
180 . Id .
181 . Id .
182 . Id .
183 . Id .
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mental injury to the child and that Mary would not face injury if she never
saw Suzanne again.184
Three elements of the opinion are particularly instructive. The first
demonstrates a strong tendency to associate “harm” not with terminating a
parental relationship with a child but instead with allowing a child to associ-
ate with a transgender person.185 “It must be remembered,” the court noted,
“that in termination proceedings, the interests of the child are paramount
and a child should not be forced to undergo psychological adjustments, es-
pecially in view of the risk involved, solely to avoid termination of a parent’s
rights.”186
Second, consistent with this idea of “best interests,” the court showed
that it was far more willing to validate social discomfort with transgender
individuals than to provide treatment or counseling to the affected child to
retain a parental bond. Under these circumstances, any attempt to provide
Mary therapy or to help Mary understand Suzanne’s situation was construed
as a kind of attack on “normal” values. Under this view, mental health coun-
seling, the court observed, constituted “mental conditioning” with doubtful
success “at best, and a serious risk of further emotional injury to the child at
worst.”187 The court was careful to note that Mary herself had told the trial
judge that she did not want to see Suzanne again.188 Similarly, the court also
dismissed Suzanne’s desire to integrate Mary within her social group, which
included members of the LGBT community, concluding that it did not see
the “necessity for inflicting a continuing sense of instability and uneasiness
on this child.”189 It noted that Suzanne “has thus postured herself in a posi-
tion of recurring conflict with the child’s mother and the ‘traditional’ up-
bringing enjoyed by Mary,” concluding that “[t]he resulting equation does
not bode well for the emotional health and well being of the child.”190
Third, central to this framing is the misperception that once a parent
transitions, they can no longer function as a parent.191 Even though the case
was handed down nearly thirty years ago, it bears mentioning that gender
dysphoria was considered a medical condition at the time (and still is today).
Yet gender dysphoria—unlike nearly every other medical condition—
184. Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 58 (Nev. 1986).
185 . Id .
186 . Id .
187 . Id . at 59.
188. In a footnote, the court observes, “It was shown that Mary is at the tender age when
she is very much concerned about the impression of her peers and doesn’t want to have any
sort of uncomfortable fears. Mary would prefer to have her personal life remain a private event.
By terminating Suzanne’s parental rights, Mary will finally have the assurance and comfort of
knowing the visitation matter is settled.” Id . at 59 n.5.
189 . Id . at 59.
190 . Id .
191 . See id .
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becomes singled out and then justified as a reason for parental termina-
tion.192
Indeed, in a powerful dissent, two judges observed that even if the medi-
cal advice Suzanne received would “offend the religious precepts of many,”
the court’s decision was “unnecessarily and impermissibly punitive to the
exercise of a medical option we personally find offensive, thereby depriving a
child of a legal relationship which might well be to the child’s advantage in
the future.”193 The dissent further argued that it was important to consider
the existence of less restrictive means in place to permit preservation of the
family tie.194 The dissenting judges noted that Suzanne was even willing to
forego visitation rights, if needed, and had continued to support Mary finan-
cially because she had wanted so badly to maintain a legal and parental con-
nection to her daughter.195
The majority, however, was unconvinced. In a final, parting observation,
the court laid the blame on Suzanne herself, noting that, “Suzanne, in a very
real sense, has terminated her own parental rights as a father. It was strictly
Tim Daly’s choice to discard his fatherhood and assume the role of a female
who could never be either mother or sister to his daughter.”196 In reaching
this decision, the court further deferred to the trial court’s characterization
of Suzanne as “a selfish person whose own needs, desires and wishes were
paramount and were indulged without regard to their impact on the life and
psyche of the daughter, Mary.”197 And in one swift move, the court made Su-
zanne a legal stranger to her child.
The decision was subsequently cited by other courts in other jurisdic-
tions, and it went on to serve as an example of extreme judicial prejudice
against trans parents.198 The case is an instructive lesson in how private prej-
udice against transgender individuals can be harnessed by an ex-spouse to
sever a transgender parent’s connection to a child. Here, Suzanne’s post-
192. We note that the literature has discussed the complicated role of medical interven-
tion and diagnosis at length. See, e .g ., DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE (rev. & expanded ed. 2015);
Jennifer L. Levi, A Prescription for Gender: How Medical Professionals Can Help Secure Equality
for Transgender People, 4 GEO. J. GENDER L. 721 (2003). While it may be true that some mem-
bers of the transgender population desire medical intervention, it is by no means true for eve-
ryone. In any case, it should have no effect on one’s ability to parent effectively. See Murphy,
supra note 66, at 47, 51 (“Neither is there anything about GID that necessarily undermines the
ability of transgender men and women to understand the responsibilities of parenthood, in
regard to feeding a baby, keeping the child warm and clean, playing with the baby, seeing that
the child is schooled, or, indeed, any of the other activities that are important to children’s wel-
fare.”).
193 . Daly, 715 P.2d at 64 (Gunderson, J., dissenting).
194 . Id . at 63.
195 . See id . at 60, 64.
196 . Id . at 59 (majority opinion).
197 . Id .
198 . See, e .g ., M.B. v. D.W., 236 S.W.3d 31, 38 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Daly in support
of the decision to affirm a termination of parental rights of a biological parent who underwent
gender reassignment surgery, stating Daly was overruled on other, jurisdictional, grounds).
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divorce transition led to the termination of her rights as a parent. The story
of ex-spouses attempting to leverage every advantage against one another in
court in order to improve their chances of gaining custody or visitation is
not new. However, as we just saw from the Daly case, an ex-spouse can easily
seize upon cultural discomfort regarding transgender individuals (let alone
transgender parents) and extract significant advantage in the judicial system
based on the mere fact of a parent’s transition.
Although Daly has been discussed in several cases and commentaries on
transgender parents, it was only in the last several years, due to McBride’s
significant journalistic efforts, that the world learned the full story of the
case, its outcome, and its effects on the parties after its conclusion. As
McBride documented, Suzanne later appealed her case to the U.S. Supreme
Court, but the Court let the decision stand.199 Although she fought as much
as she could, by 1989 she had dropped her claims, having lost at every
turn.200 She would never see her daughter again.201 Even when Mary turned
eighteen and could legally contact Suzanne, she never did, and she once ad-
mitted to a mutual friend that Nan had raised her to hate Suzanne.202 Even-
tually, Suzanne developed agoraphobia, struggled with alcoholism, and lost
her job, passing away alone in 2002.203
Fourteen years after its decision in Daly, the Nevada Supreme Court
overruled its decision in that case,204 in part because the Nevada Legislature
had amended the termination statute to ensure “that parental rights and
children’s rights [are] of equal importance . . . and must be considered to-
gether.”205 Although these were wins, by then it was too late. It was doubtful
that Suzanne even knew about the decision, and even more difficult to imag-
ine how she would have responded.206 “I think it would’ve made her angry,”
one friend, Kitty Wright, said, “that all of this was for nothing.”207
III. THE STATE OF TRANSPARENTHOOD: THREE BIASES
What happened to Suzanne Daly more than thirty years ago may be
tragic and unforgettable, but it is not at all that unique. Consider this exam-
ple, decades after that case. In 2015, when a member of an orthodox Jewish
community left her community in Britain in order to transition, a judge
199. McBride, supra note 161.
200 . Id .
201 . Id .
202 . Id .
203 . Id .
204 . In re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 8 P.3d 126, 132 n.4 (Nev. 2000)
(overruling Daly and specifically finding that a court must consider both the best interests of
the child and parental fault).
205 . Id . at 131.
206. McBride, supra note 161.
207 . Id .
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barred her from ever seeing her children again.208 In court, she pleaded for
the right to visit them and offered to accept “any contact conditions,” includ-
ing reverting to her previous male appearance in the early stages of her tran-
sition, just to stay in direct contact with her children.209 Her bid was denied
by the trial court, which concluded that the risk of the children and their
birth mother “being marginalised or excluded . . . is so real, and the conse-
quences so great, that this one factor, despite its many disadvantages, must
prevail over the many advantages of contact.”210 The court barred the
transgender parent from direct contact with the children, only allowing her
to send them letters or cards four times a year: on their birthdays and major
holidays.211 In a deeply revealing statement, the lower court judge argued
that his decision was not “a failure to uphold transgender rights . . . but the
upholding of the rights of the children to have the least harmful outcome in
a situation not of their making.”212
Just as in Daly, the court’s judgment subordinates the interests of the
transgender parent to a vague assertion of the “rights of the children,” a mo-
tivation that overlooks the fact that, in many situations, this factor often dic-
tates retaining a strong bond between parent and child. In fact, recognizing
this, the lower court opinion was eventually reversed by a higher court that
ruled that the decision overlooked the human rights of the transgender par-
ent and thus discriminated against her based on her gender identity.213
Yet the outcome is instructive because it shows us essentially how the
risks to transgender parents remain largely unchanged. Courts often come
out differently regarding the rights of a transgender parent, and they often
rely on evidence that plays on conventional fears and stereotypes regarding
transgender persons. In several of the custody and visitation cases that we
examine below in more detail, the applicable legal standards were used to
justify excluding the transgender parent from their child’s future. As we ar-
gue, even under the “best interest” standard, courts frequently cite concerns
that relate to a parent’s transition, their dress and appearance, and whether
or not they socialize with other transgender persons or cross-dress, in reach-
208 . See Harriet Sherwood, Transgender Jewish Woman Wins Review of Child Contact
Case, GUARDIAN (Dec. 20, 2017, 11:55 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/dec/20/
high-court-custody-case-transgender-ultra-orthodox-jewish-woman [https://perma.cc/7BZM-
CS29]; Harriet Sherwood, Transgender Ultra-Orthodox Case Reveals Painful Clash of Minority
Communities, GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2017, 8:21 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
feb/03/transgender-ultra-orthodox-court-case-reveals-painful-clash-of-minority-communities
[https://perma.cc/SH43-Z8ME]; see also J v. B [2017] EWHC (Fam) 4, [2017] 4 WLR 201
(Eng).
209 . See Sherwood, Transgender Jewish Woman Wins Review of Child Contact Case, su-
pra note 208.
210 . Id .
211 . See J v . B, [2017] EWHC (Fam) 4 [41].
212 . Id .
213 . See Sherwood, Transgender Jewish Woman Wins Review of Child Contact Case, su-
pra note 208.
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ing their determinations. These decisions often reflect a severe misunder-
standing of the transgender population, regularly substituting a court’s
judgment for expert testimony and considering variables that are not clearly
linked to parental fitness. Most significant, courts often overlook the primary
importance of retaining—and protecting—a strong bond between parent
and child.214
A further note: many of the harms we document below apply not only to
transgender parents but to LGBT people more broadly. Same-sex couples
who break up may share the experience of having one partner attempt to use
the lack of formal recognition for their relationship to deny the other parent
a legal relationship with the children they raised together. And parents who
come out as lesbian, gay, or bisexual following the breakup of a different-sex
marriage often have their sexual orientation used as a weapon against them
by their heterosexual exes who seek to deny them custody or visitation. But
while the “T” for “transgender” is often subsumed under the broader LGBT
(or queer) category, it is also important to recognize the particularized forms
of discrimination faced by transgender individuals, both inside and outside
the law, that carry a different trajectory from those who face discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. Those differences stem from factors that
may include the small size of the transgender population and thus the lack of
exposure to and education about trans people or trans identity, and the ar-
guably deeper and more virulent prejudice against those who visibly do not
conform to gender norms. In a post-marriage-equality world, being lesbian
or gay is, more often, seen as close to normal. Being trans or gender variant,
all too often, still is not.
A. Methodology and Limitations
In our study, we conducted a search of the case law, published and un-
published, looking for custody or family law disputes that dealt with
transgender parents. We have reviewed every case we could find, published
or unpublished, that involved a transgender parent, coming up with thirty
cases in total, spanning from 1971 to 2015.215 We found that at trial, 63 per-
cent of transgender parents lost their cases, and 62 percent of transgender
parents lost on appeal, in part due to explicit biases that relate to the
transgender status of the parent.216
214. For an excellent discussion of the harms of nonrecognition, see NeJaime, supra note
103, at 2317–23.
215 . See supra note 23. While there are not many cases, we note a significant number of
them are unpublished, which may suggest a discomfort in giving these cases precedential value.
216 . See Appendix A. By “lost their cases,” we mean a denial of the transgender parent’s
claim, mostly involving loss of custody, a narrowing of visitation rights, termination of parent-
age, or some combination of these outcomes. These percentages include some cases in which
the parental rights of both parents were terminated. Also counted as losses are cases in which it
was not strictly a trans parent whose custody or visitation rights were affected, but a parent
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Of course, a few opening disclaimers here are warranted. First, we note
the small size of our data, which weighs against predicting the landscape of
future outcomes. Because of the small number of cases, we did not randomly
collect a representative sample; instead, we gathered all available cases.217 Af-
ter reading the cases, we looked for patterns that could be construed as
meaningful; in other words, a pattern that was large enough to be regarded
as a trend rather than an “outlier” or an anomalous case.218
Admittedly, the small number of cases weighs strongly against making
broad and predictive generalizations about the future path of the law in this
field. Here, it is important to note that our goal was not to predict future cas-
es, nor to explain a definite rationale behind the outcome, but rather to
demonstrate how both implicit and explicit forms of trans-related bias can
surface at times, deleteriously affecting the outcome for the transgender par-
ent. In this light, we echo Clifford Rosky’s observations that even without a
predictive intent, the analysis “may still shed new light on old problems,
leading us toward new lines of advocacy and thought.”219 Consequently,
while we should be cautious about drawing broad generalizations from the
data, particularly given the changing legal status of trans individuals over the
last fifty years, the results help us to situate the legal realities faced by many
transgender parents in court decisions and suggest some further modes of
evolution.
We also note some further disclaimers. Neither the appellate or trial
court opinions we draw from may be representative of the mediations, arbi-
trations, and settlements that may populate a much wider degree of parent-
ing disputes.220 And there is the fact that times have changed significantly, as
have the legal and social contexts under which these cases were filed.221 But
at the same time, the evidence of explicit and implicit bias in these cases is
too mounting to avoid. Some of the cases reflect a grave misunderstanding of
the lives and experiences of transgender parents, jettisoning expert testimo-
ny. And others simply overlook the fact that a central function of family
courts is to ensure a bond between parent and child.
Further, while more and more transgender individuals are forming
families in the world at large, our review of the case law suggests that judges
have taken a somewhat outdated set of approaches. Part of this may be at-
tributable to the very small numbers of cases. Even though studies show a
demographic rise in the transgender parent population, both anecdotally and
whose loss in court seems attributable at least in part to association with a trans individual. See
infra notes 306–308 and accompanying text.
217 . See generally Rosky, supra note 25, at 276.
218 . See generally id .
219 . Id . at 277.
220. In our project, we pulled every case that addressed the marriage, custody, or visita-
tion of a transgender parent.
221 . See id . at 274 & n.79 (making this observation in lesbian and gay parenting cases,
particularly regarding the adoption of the nexus test in such contexts).
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empirically, only a fraction of transgender parents will make their way into
court through divorce, custody, or estate proceedings.222 Many of those cases
will likely be the most acrimonious of situations, and most judges will have
had little exposure to transgender parents.
Nevertheless, the small number of published opinions like Daly, we ar-
gue, risks creating a feedback loop that sets precedent, affecting future family
law cases. The cases, as we see them, are also reflective of a disquieting trend
within the case law, in which courts consider evidence regarding the
transgender parent that would normally not arise in the case of a cisgender,
gender conforming parent. For this reason, better, more current research
that captures the dynamic plurality of the transgender and nonbinary par-
enting community, and more thoughtful judging in response, is especially
important.
B. Three Persistent Biases
Through our case research, we focused on isolating the biases and ap-
proaches relied upon in the judicial opinions. Thankfully, due in part to the
growing adoption of the best interest and nexus tests, we could find no re-
cent, reported cases that utilize an obvious per se standard of terminating
recognition of a transgender parent. At the same time, however, our investi-
gation suggests that transgender parents continue to face unequal treatment
at the hands of family court judges, who enjoy enormous discretion in decid-
ing these cases and who at times demonstrate bias in their judgments to the
disadvantage of the transgender parent.
Our research reveals that there are cases, like the one involving a British
Orthodox Jewish parent discussed above, that fall short of the per se rule but
are still deserving of the most scrutiny for bias. Just as the nexus test can
serve to suggest an increasing liberalization regarding the rights of lesbian
and gay parents, it can also serve to mask the employment of stereotypical,
prejudicial viewpoints about transgender parents and have the same result as
a per se denial of custody. The only difference here is that the discrimination
is harder to spot because it is often couched in indirect observations regard-
ing the transgender parent’s behavior.
Most troubling and deserving of further analysis, we argue, is this wider
range of cases. These cases might purport to avoid directly discriminating
against the transgender parent, but they still employ arguments that actively
conflate concerns about gender transition with parenting concerns. Some of
these, cited by experts, include the following: arguments that “continued
contact with a [transgender] parent may have detrimental effects on the
child’s psychosexual development”; “that the child’s mental health will be
[deleteriously] affected by difficulties in comprehending the . . . transition”;
222 . See STOTZER ET AL., supra note 22 (citing relevant studies).
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or that stigma from peers will negatively impact the child.223 All of these ar-
guments, as we show below, have been repudiated by the available evidence.
Yet, by raising them, courts may wind up with the same result as under the
per se rule: discriminating against the transgender parent.224
Indeed, courts have found the following specific reasons relevant to jus-
tify ending or limiting a transgender parent’s contact with a child under a
purported nexus test:
• fear of contagion of gender nonconformity;225
• the circumstances surrounding disclosure of a parent’s intent to
transition;226
• the parent’s decision to transition or express their gender, which
is associated with presumptions of selfishness and distraction;227
• a presumption of instability regarding the gender identity of the
transgender parent;228
• concern about the effect of the transgender identity of the parent
on the child’s sexual orientation, gender expression, or gender
identity;229
• the specter of a presumed connection to sexuality;230
• a child’s (potential) anxiety around transition and loss;231 and
• the risk of stigma from being associated with a transgender parent
or other transgender individuals.232
223. David Freedman et al., Children and Adolescents with Transsexual Parents Referred
to a Specialist Gender Identity Development Service: A Brief Report of Key Developmental Fea-
tures, 7 CLINICAL CHILD PYSCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 423, 423–32, 424 (2002).
224. Indeed, this phenomenon can be compared to Reva Siegel’s concept of “preserva-
tion-through-transformation,” where privilege is maintained despite changing legal norms. We
are grateful to Doug NeJaime for this observation. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111,
1119 (1997) (applying this theory to explore the dominance of racial hierarchy during the Re-
construction Era).
225 . See M. v. M., No. FA 940064700, 1996 WL 434302, at *23 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 11,
1996); supra Section III.B.3 (on contagion).
226. M.B. v. D.W., 236 S.W.3d 31 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).
227. Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 59 (Nev. 1986); see Tipsword v. Tipsword, No. 1 CA-CV
12-0066, 2013 WL 1320444, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2013) (unpublished memorandum
decision); In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
228 . See Cisek v. Cisek, No. 80 C.A. 113, 1982 WL 6161, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20,
1982).
229 . See M.R. v. San Mateo Cty. Superior Court, No. A122117, 2008 WL 4650440, at *9
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2008).
230. J.L.S. v. D.K.S., 943 S.W.2d 766, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
231 . Daly, 715 P.2d at 59.
232 . See Lowhorn v. Lowhorn, No. 49A04-0712-CV-678, 2008 WL 2839485, at *1 (Ind.
Ct. App. July 24, 2008); In re Reesing, 483 P.2d 872, 873 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
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Many of these variables, when examined more closely, tend to cluster in-
to three categories of bias, each expressing a different set of conflicting (and
sometimes paradoxical) concerns regarding gender nonconformity. In the
first set of cases, the court expresses a fear of harm to the child based on the
presumed effect on the child due to the permanence of the gender transition
of the parent. In a second set of cases, usually involving (assigned-male) par-
ents who cross-dress,233 courts express a somewhat opposing fear surround-
ing exposing the child to what we describe as gender volition—that is, that
the child will be harmed by witnessing the destabilization of the parent’s
gender expression in transgressing their state-assigned gender. Whereas the
first category of cases is obsessed with the permanence of gender transition,
primarily focusing on gender identity, the second category of cases demon-
strates some discomfort with the impermanence of gender-related expres-
sion, what we call volition-related concerns. In these cases, the courts may
directly require the parent to restrict their gender expression in front of the
child, instructing them to refrain from cross-dressing and the like. A third
category of cases, closely related to the prior category, expresses concern
about the harm posed to the child through the lens of gender contagion—the
idea that normalizing gender transition or variance can introduce a level of
instability into the child’s own gender identity. A related set of concerns is
associational: the court terminates or narrows a child’s relationship to a par-
ent based on their association with a transgender person.
Each of these concerns, we found, can often become relevant and deter-
minative in parental custody and visitation decisions. Of course, it is im-
portant to note that these concerns are not always the sole or dominant
rationale for the court’s decision, since family court decisions always reflect a
maze of concurrent considerations. Nevertheless, our research suggests that
these three strands of concerns—transition, volition, and contagion—
constitute an appreciable, and overlooked, part of the landscape of judicial
analysis.
1. Concerns Regarding Transition
In our study, we found that courts frequently conflated concerns about
transition with concerns about parenting. As Carlos Ball has pointed out, in
such cases, courts question whether a transgender parent can still function as
a parent after transitioning, often reaching a negative conclusion.234 Howev-
er, as Ball observes, it is not clear why gender transition is at all relevant to
legal parentage; a gender transition has nothing to do with one’s attributes as
a parent.235 In such situations, it is not the fact of the transition that causes
233 . While the courts identify such parents as men who cross-dress, it is of course possi-
ble that they are transgender women who have been incorrectly identified by the courts. We
tried to be as accurate as possible, but it is entirely possible that the reported language failed to
capture the importance of self-identity.
234. BALL, supra note 22, at 191.
235 . Id .
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concern for the court, but rather the facts that are connected to the transi-
tion. Among these facts are the process of disclosure (or lack thereof) to the
children and the transgender parent’s emotional connection to the children
prior to the transition. Consideration of these transition-related factors often
results in a determination adverse to the transgender parent.
Concerns about disclosure of transition . Many courts express greater
concern for children regarding the circumstances of disclosure of a parent’s
transition, just as we saw in Daly. The results can be devastating for the
transgender parent, who is caught in a catch-22 between disclosure and self-
protection. In one typical case, the court granted an adoption without the
consent of the transgender parent, thereby terminating her parental rights.236
In that case, the court justified its view on the grounds that there was no evi-
dence in the record to suggest that the transgender parent had tried to pre-
pare the children for her transition.237 During a holiday visit, the court noted
concern that the children all noticed that the appellant, Martha Boyd, a
transgender female, “exhibited various feminine features,” such as long fin-
gernails, short shorts, and evidence of breast augmentation.238 She also sent
one of the children a photograph of her “dressed as a woman,” the court ob-
served.239
Ultimately each of the three children said that “they did not want to see
the appellant again.”240 Two years after she underwent gender confirmation
surgery, Martha filed a motion to enforce visitation rights with the only re-
maining child who had not been emancipated, but she was told that the
child, Sarah, did not want to see the parent and was in counseling.241 The
court responded by directing Martha not to contact Sarah, eventually grant-
ing the petition for adoption by a stepfather and terminating Martha’s rights
entirely.242 In examining the evidence on appeal, with a more deferential
standard to the lower court’s factfinding, the appeals court upheld the ver-
dict, noting that Sarah had suffered a psychological injury, including major
depression, a declination in student performance, suicidal thoughts, physical
symptoms of headaches, and withdrawn behavior.243
The court noted that a treating psychiatrist clearly linked the depression
and other issues to the “emotional injury occasioned by the appellant’s ac-
236. M.B. v. D.W., 236 S.W.3d 31 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007). This case is also extensively dis-
cussed in BALL, supra note 22, at 186–89.
237 . M .B ., 236 S.W.3d at 35.
238 . Id . at 33, 35.
239 . Id . at 35.
240 . Id . at 33–34.
241 . Id . In fact, Martha had tried to visit her children, but had been rebuffed by her ex-
spouse. See BALL, supra note 22, at 188.
242 . M .B., 236 S.W.3d at 34. The standard for termination of a parent’s rights under Ken-
tucky law requires: (1) a showing of abuse or neglect; (2) a showing that termination is in the
child’s best interests; and (3) the existence of grounds that show injury, emotional harm, or an
inability to care for the child’s basic needs, among other categories. Id .
243 . Id . at 35.
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tions.”244 Sarah herself testified, stating in court that she felt “ ‘abandoned,’
and that the worst part was ‘knowing that I did not have a father, where you
go to school and say, “I don’t have a father, he’s a woman.” ’ ”245 Her mother
and sibling also testified about the issue, characterized by the court as a series
of “detrimental effects on [Sarah] brought about by the appellant’s ac-
tions.”246
In its opinion, the court clearly wrestles with what to do. Like other
courts, this court was careful to note in its opinion that the circuit court did
not find that the transition, “by itself, inflicted [Sarah]’s emotional injury
and justified termination . . . . Rather, the court found that the entire series of
events, including the appellant’s behavior surrounding the sex change,
caused the emotional injury.”247 Although the court noted that none of the
children were “adequately prepared” for the transition, it concluded that the
circuit court showed no error in holding the appellant primarily responsible
for Sarah’s injury.248 At no time, the record showed, did Martha ever notify
anyone in the family either before or during the transition, a factor that the
lower court characterized as “at best an unconscionable indifference to the
emotional welfare” of the family.249
Throughout the opinion, we see the emergence of several themes: first,
the parent’s desire to transition is cast as an “injury” to the child; second, the
“harm” caused by the transition is one caused not by society’s intolerance,
but by the parent’s own choices; and, third, the child’s desire to have a “legal
father” justifies the termination. The opinion cited Sarah’s testimony, where
she explained that “it was her decision to seek this adoption, and that, ‘I want
to be able to have a father in my life, a legal father. I don’t have that with my
biological father and I don’t want it with my biological father.’ ”250 The court
rejected the prospect of less drastic measures, deferring to the trial court’s
decision to terminate the parental relationship.251
In the end, the court was careful to note, explicitly, that it was not hold-
ing that gender reassignment is, in itself, grounds for termination (even
though it cited to cases that reached similar conclusions).252 It concluded in-
stead that if a trial court concludes that termination is warranted under the
statutory requirements, then the appellant could not be “exempt” from hav-
244 . Id .
245 . Id .
246 . Id . at 35–36.
247 . Id .
248 . Id .
249 . Id .
250 . Id . at 37. Sarah went on to explain her wish to be adopted by her stepfather, explain-
ing that if the action was granted by the court, “I will be able to call him my real father. I will be
able to tell people, ‘That’s my dad, that’s my real dad,’ and I will feel like he’s always been
there.” Id .
251 . Id . at 37–38.
252 . Id . at 38.
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ing their rights terminated because the neglect or abuse occurred during the
process of the transition.253 In reaching this conclusion, however, the court
placed the blame squarely on the transitioning parent, who is already forced
to take tremendous risks—given the case law we have just discussed—in de-
ciding whether to tell her children beforehand.
Again, the court’s conclusion blames the transgender parent for making
a rational decision (given the case law) to avoid drawing attention to the is-
sue of transition.254 Even beyond this misplaced blame, studies show that
these outcomes have the further effect of forcing transgender parents even
further into the closet, often at the cost of their own well-being and that of
their children.255
Concerns surrounding emotional attachment . In addition to concerns
about the disclosure of transition, courts also express concerns surrounding
emotional attachment as it relates to transition. The emotional distance of a
transgender parent, due in part to their struggles over their transition, can
often be cited as a factor against recognizing continued parental rights, even
though the transgender parent may be in entirely different circumstances af-
ter their transition. In one example, similar to M .B . v . D .W ., a transgender
woman (the biological parent of the children) argued that a lower court im-
properly considered her transgender status in denying her claim for joint
custody of her children and thus violated her right to equal protection.256
In response, the court observed that the parent “had little interaction
with the children” and that the parent was emotionally absent during the
marriage, according to her ex-spouse and other family members.257 Then the
court continued,
Such absence may have been the by-product of Father’s emotional issues
which also led to his current transgender transformation from being Zach-
ary to Zoe. Mother also expressed concerns . . . [that] the confusion that is
just starting to surface as the person they know as “daddy” now dresses and
presents herself as a woman and wishes to be called “mommy.” Father is
certainly free to be who he or she wishes to be and as the Court commented
on at trial, the goal is for the parents to have a meaningful relationship at
some point with the children. But the consequences of and confusion
caused by his choices in the lives of 4 and 2 year old children simply cannot
be ignored.258
253 . Id .
254 . Cf . Veldorale-Griffin, supra note 62, at 477 (describing the importance of and the
challenges attending initial disclosure decisions).
255 . See id . at 478, 486, 492 (reporting predominately either no change or a positive
change in their parent-child relationships as a result of disclosure of transition).
256. Tipsword v. Tipsword, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0066, 2013 WL 1320444, at *2 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Apr. 2, 2013) (unpublished memorandum decision).
257 . Id . at *2–3.
258 . Id . at *2. This language came from the lower court, which the appellate court quoted
approvingly without citation.
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Like the courts cited above, the appeals court noted that the operative test
was the “child’s best interests and welfare,” and further observed that “[t]he
bare fact that a parent is transgender is not relevant to his or her ability to
parent effectively,” citing another case that reached this observation.259 It al-
so noted that evidence of societal prejudice due to a parent’s transgender sta-
tus cannot be a factor for consideration in the determination of custody.260
Yet at the same time that the court noted the irrelevance of the transi-
tion, it contradicted itself by noting: “But when a parent’s conduct attendant
to his or her gender transition harms the parent-child relationship, that con-
duct and resulting harm is a legitimate consideration in determining the
child’s best interests—just as all parental conduct is relevant.”261 The court
concluded that “[p]laced in context, we read the court’s reference to ‘the
consequences of and confusion caused by [Father’s] choices in the lives of 4
and 2 year old children’ ” to refer not to the transgender identity of the par-
ent, “but to the effect of his choices in absenting himself from the children’s
lives.”262 The court affirmed the custody determination.263
Such cases, inasmuch as they recite the irrelevance of the parent’s
transgender status, also unwittingly rely on the transition decision of the
parent as a factor that weighs in favor of terminating the parent’s bid for
recognition. Courts here characterize transgender parents as being “distract-
ed” due to their transition.264 Or, like in Daly, they may describe the
transgender parent as “selfish” for their transition decision, conflating their
transition with an inability to serve as a parent to their child.265
In another custody case, Cisek v . Cisek, an appellate court overturned a
lower court’s decision permitting the transgender parent to continue visita-
tion, suggesting that it might have viewed the transgender parent more sym-
pathetically if that parent had offered more evidence that the transition was
“compelled by some mental imbalance.”266 Absent such evidence, the court
was left to wonder, rhetorically, “Was his sex change simply an indulgence of
some fantasy?”267 Whether such evidence would have in fact made a differ-
ence in the outcome is unclear, but the court certainly implied that the im-
259 . Id . (citing Christian v. Randall, 516 P.2d 132, 133–34 (Colo. App. 1973)).
260 . Id . (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984)).
261 . Id .
262 . Id . at *3. We have purposely cited the court’s language here, using the pronouns
“he” and “Father,” not because we agree with those terms for these circumstances, but in order
to underscore the bias faced by the transgender parent.
263 . Id . at *4.
264 . See id . at *3.
265. Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 59 (Nev. 1986); see also In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208,
210–11 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding termination and observing that “[i]t was Danielle’s
choice to place her needs above those of the children by choosing to leave the State” when an
intersex parent began the process of transition and moved to another state to finalize transi-
tion, yet failed to communicate with children’s counselor about transition).
266. No. 80 C.A. 113, 1982 WL 6161, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 1982).
267 . Cisek, 1982 WL 6161, at *2.
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mutable—or at least unavoidable—character of a parent’s gender identity
could be entitled to greater consideration than a purely indulgent, selfish
“choice” perhaps connected to sexual desire.268 The court then cited an ex-
pert who testified that the transgender status of the plaintiff would have a
“sociopathic affect [sic] on the child” and “felt that physical contact should
be stopped.”269 Since the court saw its duty as protecting the children, it con-
cluded that “[t]here is evidence that there might be mental harm. Common
sense dictates that there can be social harm,” and decided that without ther-
apy, “the two minor children are in harm’s way.”270 Like in Daly, the court in
Cisek presented the transgender parent with an impossible choice: transition,
and risk losing their child; or refrain from transition, and risk losing their
own self-recognition.
2. Concerns About Volition
The previous discussion demonstrated situations in which the transi-
tion—either its permanence or other factors—indirectly influenced a court’s
decision to rule against the transgender parent. In other cases, particularly
those involving cross-dressing behavior, courts express concern, either di-
rectly or indirectly, about the effect of the parent’s behavior or expression on
the child, prompting the court to examine such factors as the location of the
cross-dressing behavior and whether the child has been exposed. If the
transgender parent is granted visitation rights, courts will, at times, subject
the transgender parent to significant restrictions to ensure that the child is
not exposed to gender nonconforming behavior or expression.271 In cases
where a transgender parent is able to retain custody, a court’s decision may
“rest[] at least in part on the fact that the parent had concealed her gender
identity from her children.”272 The concern here is not the effect of the per-
268. This language also echoes the Nevada Supreme Court’s description of Suzanne Daly
as “a selfish person whose own needs, desires, and wishes were paramount and were indulged
without regard to their impact on the life and psyche of the daughter.” Daly, 715 P.2d at 59.
269 . Cisek, 1982 WL 6161, at *1.
270 . Id . at *2.
271 . See M.R. v. San Mateo Cty. Superior Court, No. A122117, 2008 WL 4650440, at *9
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2008) (“The issue of the cross-dressing is relevant as follows: I don’t care
what you do in your personal life, sir. That’s your business. But you do it around children who
are the dependent children of this court after a social worker told you not to, now it’s my busi-
ness. These boys are at an age where they can begin to become very confused. You’re not help-
ing the situation by not following the social worker’s rules.”).
272. LESLIE COOPER, PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF TRANSGENDER PARENTS AND THEIR
CHILDREN 7 (2013), https://nicic.gov/protecting-rights-transgender-parents-and-their-
children-guide-parents-and-lawyers [https://perma.cc/B2LZ-VLSX] (noting cases where evi-
dence demonstrated that the parent would not cross-dress in front of the children or had de-
cided to maintain their state-assigned gender identity); see, e .g ., In re Custody of T.J., No. C2-
87-1786, 1988 WL 8302, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1988) (noting that the parent would
“maintain his male identity”); In re Marriage of D.F.D., 862 P.2d 368, 371 (Mont. 1993) (noting
that father would not cross-dress in front of child); P.L.W. v. T.R.W., 890 S.W.2d 688, 690
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (noting privacy of cross-dressing).
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manence of the shift in gender; it is about the child’s exposure to gender flu-
idity.273
In reality, however, gender falls along a spectrum, not a binary. While
some people have a gender identity and expression that perfectly matches
binary gender norms of masculinity or femininity, many do not. Some peo-
ple who identify as transgender or otherwise fall within that term’s umbrella
have an explicitly nonbinary gender identity—a category that is finding in-
creasing recognition in recent years from courts and legislatures as well as
society as a whole.274 Others whose gender expression is different from tradi-
tional expectations of masculinity and femininity, either all of the time or
some of the time, may describe themselves as butch, femme, gender noncon-
forming, gender variant, gender fluid, gender expansive, or use other terms
to describe themselves. The terms “transvestite” and “cross-dresser” (which
we often see in these opinions) first gained currency in the mid-twentieth
century to describe heterosexual men who occasionally or frequently dressed
as women but continued to identify as men.275 While those terms are still in
common use among older generations or those who feel pressure to keep
their gender expression secret, younger people today are more likely to self-
describe with terms like genderqueer, gender fluid, or other terms they use
denote a nonbinary identity.
Gender nonconforming behavior, such as cross-dressing, in male-
assigned people tends to prompt the most negative reactions—presumably
due to pervasive norms of sexism and homophobia that penalize men par-
ticularly harshly because they have adopted characteristics associated with
women. Unlike transgender men and transgender women, cross-dressers
may be seen as secretive, primarily motivated by sexual purposes, and able to
choose when (and whether) they will transgress gender norms. These con-
cerns about cross-dressing have appeared in academic literature as well, con-
273. Part of the focus on cross-dressing behavior may be indirectly linked, somewhat
ironically, to the rise of transgender recognition. As more and more individuals have been able
to acquire recognition through medicalized forms of intervention, often gender confirmation
surgery, it has contributed to the view that transition from one assigned sex to another, often
through medical intervention, is the only appropriate way to express a gender different from
that assigned at birth. That is, there are only two acceptable options: cisgender identity and
expression, or complete and uniform transition to the opposite binary gender.
274 . See ARIELLE WEBB ET AL., NON-BINARY GENDER IDENTITIES: FACT SHEET (2015),
http://www.apadivisions.org/division-44/resources/advocacy/non-binary-facts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A67V-2KSZ]; James Michael Nichols, California Becomes First State to Le-
gally Recognize a Third Gender, HUFFPOST (Oct. 17, 2017, 12:45 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/california-third-gender-option_us_59e61784e4b0ca9f4
83b17b9 [https://perma.cc/C6K3-VEB3] (describing a California law recognizing nonbinary
identity on birth certificates and driver’s licenses). See generally Katyal, supra note 12 (discuss-
ing how cross-dressing and other forms of gender variant expression often receive less protec-
tion by courts).
275 . See Dallas Denny, Transgender Communities of the United States in the Late Twenti-
eth Century, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 171, 171–73; STRYKER, supra note 29,
at 17–18.
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tributing to a lack of understanding (at best) and an overpathologizing of
such behavior (at worst) in the context of transgender parenting.276
Indeed, discomfort with cross-dressing has existed in the law for hun-
dreds of years, once compelling some jurisdictions to pass laws that banned
individuals from appearing “in a dress or costume not customarily worn by
his or her sex.”277 Although those laws were eventually overturned due to
First Amendment considerations, a persistent discomfort regarding cross-
dressing pervades the law.278 Since then, courts have permitted spouses to
divorce upon discovery of cross-dressing or transition-related behavior, on
the grounds that “humiliating and degrading” conduct “to a woman has
been held to provide evidence sufficient in itself to constitute indignities.”279
Other cases have found evidence of cross-dressing to be relevant to the
court’s ruling against the party.280 Due in no small part to the discomfort
276. In one law review article about transvestism, for example, the authors argue that
cross-dressing can often coexist with other kinds of paraphilias, like sadomasochistic behavior,
general fetishism, exhibitionism, and rape. Khaya Novick Eisenberg et al., Transvestism and
Foster Parenting: A Child Protection Concern?, 15 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 175, 182–84 (2014).
Although the authors note that most “transvestite persons” live “normal, functional lives” and
that any increased association with criminal sex acts only appears in the clinical population
(rather than the normative population), the article continues to exaggerate a notion of risk to
children. Id. at 194–95. For an excellent commentary on these issues, see Julia M. Serano, The
Case Against Autogynephilia, 12 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 176 (2010).
277. Hasan Shafiqullah, Note, Shape-Shifters, Masqueraders, & Subversives: An Argument
for the Liberation of Transgendered Individuals, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 195, 204 (1997); see
also CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 901-D9 (1971) (outlawing non-gender-
conforming dress worn “with the intent of committing any indecent or immoral act”);
ERICKSON EDUC. FOUND., LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSEXUALISM AND INFORMATION ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 2–3 (rev. ed. 1971), https://archive.org/details/
legalaspectsoftr0000noau [https://perma.cc/4THE-APJS] (reporting that at least ten states had
laws prohibiting cross-dressing at the time of publication and that New York only recently re-
pealed a similar law).
278 . See Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000) (classifying gender-
fluid appearance of plaintiff to be a choice rather than an immutable aspect of their identity);
Joseph Landau, “Soft Immutability” and “Imputed Gay Identity”: Recent Developments in
Transgender and Sexual-Orientation-Based Asylum Law, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 237, 237–38
(2005); Yofi Tirosh, Adjudicating Appearance: From Identity to Personhood, 19 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 49, 58 (2007) (noting that “underneath every personal appearance there is (and
should be) a solid, clear, and stable identity of the bearer”).
279. McKolanis v. McKolanis, 644 A.2d 1256, 1259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Steinke v.
Steinke, 357 A.2d 674, 676–77 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).
280 . See, e .g ., In re A.J., 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762, 766 (Ct. App. 2015) (noting relevance of
father’s date with a trans person to guardianship); In re G.V., B258385, 2015 WL 996610, at *2
(Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2015) (noting father had posted ad online looking for sexual relations
with a trans person); People v. Anderson, No. C061974, 2011 WL 2341297, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jun. 13, 2011) (noting that evidence of defendant’s cross-dressing was relevant to the crime);
Spring v. Spring, No. FA054004151S, 2006 WL 3008446, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2006)
(noting that father’s cross-dressing detrimentally affected relationship with daughter); In re
S.R.A., No. 90351, 2004 WL 2578660, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2004) (noting evidence of
cross-dressing paraphernalia was relevant to evidence of sexual misconduct); In re Jeremy Jor-
don M., No. 101297, 2012 WL 1737135, at *11 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. May 10, 2012) (noting that cross-
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with gender fluidity, it is not unusual for a parent’s cross-dressing activities
to be considered by the court in custody determinations and monitored dur-
ing visitation. In one case, a court denied a request for overnight visitation
on the grounds of the parent’s cross-dressing activities, even though the re-
viewing court noted that the testimony was contradictory and derived in part
from hearsay evidence, because of the “impressionable” age of the child.281
In one typical example underscoring the invasiveness of these re-
strictions, a court decided to award custody to a male-assigned parent who
cross-dressed over the mother who had sexually abused their daughter.282
But even though the court sided with this parent, it took more than just a
passing notice of the parent’s cross-dressing behavior, noting that “[h]e
cross-dresses in the privacy of his bedroom and has taken steps to insure that
his daughter does not see him in women’s clothing.”283 In that case, the court
further noted that in the years that he has looked after his young daughter,
“he has not received or kept transvestite literature in his home.”284
While both sides presented testimony about the impact of the father’s
cross-dressing on the child, leading the court to cite testimony from one ex-
pert who argued that “knowledge of respondent’s behavior would be harmful
to the child’s own sexual identity,” the court was careful to stress the insulat-
ed, private nature of the cross-dressing behavior, which the court thought
mitigated any risk to the child.285 This outcome is not unusual—our research
identified a trend in situations where transgender parents won their cases: in
many such cases, any cross-dressing behavior was private.286
dressing in front of child was considered inappropriate); State v. Liddle, No. 23287, 2007 WL
1138421, ¶ 59 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2007) (finding evidence of cross-dressing relevant to
sexual predation); State v. Kessler, 879 P.2d 333, 336 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (finding evidence
of cross-dressing relevant to prosecution decisions).
281. B. v. B., 585 N.Y.S.2d 65 (App. Div. 1992); cf . Joanna K. v. Jennifer L., No. E06693,
2005 WL 668829, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2005) (evidence of father’s cross-dressing raised
but rejected by court in custody determination).
282 . In re Welfare of V.H., 412 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
283 . Id . (noting that the child’s therapists and guardian ad litem, who knew of the par-
ent’s cross-dressing, supported awarding custody to the father, and observing that the father
planned to tell his daughter about his cross-dressing behavior with the aid of a therapist when
she was older). Note that here (as in other, similar cases) we have used male pronouns when
the reported facts of this case do not suggest female self-identification or transition, but we
note that courts have often been mistaken in their classifications and pronoun usage, particu-
larly regarding the recognition of transition or intent to transition. Wherever possible, we tried
to use terms, names, and pronouns that followed the transgender person’s own representa-
tions, but note that our language may be limited in its accuracy due to an inadequate factual
record.
284 . Id .
285 . Id . at 393–94.
286 . E .g ., M. v. M., No. FA 940064700, 1996 WL 434302, at *19 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 11,
1996) (finding that the cross-dressing behavior of the trans parent’s friends—and child’s god-
parents—was “not entered into in front of the children” and awarding custody to the trans
parent, about whom no cross-dressing behavior was discussed); V .H ., 412 N.W.2d at 393 (not-
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We have already seen, in such cases, the desire to confine or ban cross-
dressing expression. But this intention often crosses into a juridical concern
about who the transgender parent associates with, and whether their friends
or partners also display gender variance. In one example, a parent moved her
two sons to another state (as in Daly) and refused to allow any contact with
the transgender parent, prompting one of the sons to express unhappiness
and suicidal thoughts due to his lack of contact with the transgender par-
ent.287 In Missouri, their new location, the cisgender mother filed a petition
for dissolution, arguing that her ex-spouse had “adopted a lifestyle such that
it would be extremely harmful to the minor children for them to be placed
even in the temporary custody of or visitation with [the transgender par-
ent].”288
After a hearing, the mother was awarded primary custody of the two
sons subject to visitation rights that were set to begin after the parent’s tran-
sition.289 The trial court had recognized that the children’s transgender par-
ent was a loving and caring parent, and the court required the mother to
permit the children to see a counselor to address transition-related issues.290
At the same time, however, the court also issued an order dictating that dur-
ing temporary custody, the transgender parent “shall not cohabit with other
transsexuals or sleep with another female.”291
Over a year later, the mother asked for sole custody on appeal, arguing
that the counseling provisions were vague and inadequate and that the court
erred in granting joint custody because the parties lacked “any commonality
of beliefs” regarding child-rearing.292 Like so many of the other cases, the
court decided to take the position least favorable to the transgender parent.
Despite the strong evidence of a parental bond, the court terminated the or-
der of joint custody, observing that it was “not designed to insure that a par-
ent maintains his or her relationship with the child.”293 Since there was no
ing that the trans parent “has taken positive steps to keep his behavior from his daughter” and
“does not cross-dress in front of her”); P.L.W. v. T.R.W., 890 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994) (declining to restrict trans parent’s visitation rights after noting that “the incidents in-
volving Mother’s clothing . . . were not in the child’s physical presence”); In re Marriage of
D.F.D., 862 P.2d 368, 376 (Mont. 1993) (reversing district court’s restriction of visitation to
child’s parent who cross-dressed, on the grounds that the behavior was private, secretive, and
addressed in therapy)..
287. During the marriage, the transgender parent struggled with the urge to cross-dress,
and then finally decided to transition. No first names are provided in the opinion, which is why
we use the terms above. J.L.S. v. D.K.S., 943 S.W.2d 766, 770 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
288 . Id .
289 . Id . at 769, 771–72.
290 . Id . at 771–72.
291 . Id . at 775.
292 . Id . at 773–74.
293 . Id .
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additional evidence to suggest how the parents might function as a unit, the
court simply handed all actual legal custody to the cisgender mother.294
On appeal, the court further upheld the invasive court order that re-
quired the transgender parent not to cohabit with other transgender indi-
viduals.295 The appeals court first noted the relevance of past and present
conduct as a guide to future behavior, concluding that “[c]onsideration of
conduct is not limited to that which has in fact detrimentally affected the
children.”296 It then went on to note that the transgender spouse testified that
she is indeed living with one other “transsexual” and had a woman sleep over
on occasion, thereby justifying the previous trial court’s order.297 The court,
reflexively, rejected any consideration of the privacy or associational rights
of the trans parent, even though most of these activities took place outside of
visitation.
Like many of the other cases we have explored, this opinion was accom-
panied by a dissent. The dissent pointed out that the sole reason the cis-
gender mother objected to the transgender parent’s joint custody was
because she objected to the trans parent’s lifestyle, and it recommended a
remand for trial on the issue of what was in the children’s best interests.298
The dissent further noted that the record showed that the mother was sup-
portive of overnight visits, so long as “he acted in no way like a woman,” and
suggested modifying the order limiting contact with trans persons or other
women only when the children were in her custody.299 In addition, the dis-
sent pointed out that the evidence showed that the children asked to see their
parent and missed her.300
In the above case, two things become clear. First, the court appears far
more concerned with “protecting” the children from exposure to cross-
dressing (and other “transsexuals”) than maintaining the children’s relation-
ship to their parent. Contrary to all governing law, the court flatly rejected
the idea that the purpose of a joint custody decision was to maintain the par-
ents’ relationship with the child, deciding that it instead had to rule exclu-
sively based on the perceived best interests of the child.301 Second, in order to
maintain clear boundaries regarding gender, the court engaged in a detailed,
fairly invasive set of parameters for the transgender parent to follow—what
294 . Id . at 774–75.
295 . Id .
296 . Id .
297. Citing this evidence, the court observed that there was no abuse of discretion in
making these requirements. Id .
298 . Id . at 775, 781 (Karohl, J., dissenting in part).
299 . Id . We have changed some of the pronouns here to accord with the transgender par-
ent’s identity, but note the use of “he” by the court.
300 . Id . at 776.
301 . Id . at 774–75 (majority opinion).
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they can wear and when, and who they can socialize and cohabitate with.302
This is not uncommon. Taylor Flynn has written that in many cases, “trans
individuals must undergo an almost unimaginable host of intrusive inquiries
about their bodies, medical history, and sex lives.”303 In another case, even
when a transgender parent initially won sole custody, she had to seek a pro-
tective order to ban her former spouse from asking questions about the dys-
phoria, the identities of other support group members, and related
information, presumably to avoid raising the risk of an even more invasive
modification from the court regarding association.304 Again, these cases sug-
gest a near-constant concern about the impact of cross-dressing on the child,
elevating these concerns to suggest that they motivate judicial decisions.305
Finally, there are at least four cases in which a custodial parent’s rela-
tionship with a transgender person led to a reexamination of custody, in-
cluding one case in which a Tennessee trial court threatened to remove two
daughters from a mother’s custody if she did not end a relationship with a
“transvestite” boyfriend.306 In two of these cases, the courts’ decisions made
children legally orphans—orphans—due to the parent’s association with
transgender individuals.307 In one 1980 case, the Oregon Court of Appeals
actually terminated a mother’s rights to her children because she continued
302 . See In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that trial court would
prohibit visitation unless transgender parent dressed in state-assigned gender, rather than her
gender identity).
303. Flynn, supra note 22, at 38.
304 . In re Custody of T.J., No. C2-87-1786, 1988 WL 8302, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 9,
1988).
305 . E .g ., id . at *2–3.
306 . See Perez, supra note 22, at 391–92. Note that Perez slightly misreads Isbell. In Isbell
the appellate court reprinted district court allegations that the parent’s friend was a transves-
tite; given that the only evidence of cross-dressing involved a Halloween party, the appellate
court overturned the district court. Isbell v. Isbell, No. 01-A-01-9002-GS00058, 1990 WL
107497, at *1, *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 816 S.W.2d 735 (Tenn.
1991); see also Lowhorn v. Lowhorn, No. 49A04–0712–CV–678, 2008 WL 2839485 (Ind. Ct.
App. July 24, 2008) (overturning the trial court, rejecting its finding that the mother’s
longstanding platonic friendship with a transgender female has had a negative psychological
impact on the children, and noting that the friendship involved only a “private dinner in their
residence” a few times a month); In re Reesing, 483 P.2d 872, 873–74 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971)
(affirming keeping child in temporary custody of the Department of Health and Social Ser-
vices, due in part to parent’s roommate’s plan to undergo transition, concluding that “[t]here is
an appearance of a relationship between persons within the home which are likely to cause the
child future humiliations, embarrassments and degradations”). For an example of how far as-
sociational concerns—and those about cross-dressing—can extend, see Pulliam v. Smith, 501
S.E.2d 898, 901 (N.C. 1998), where the court awarded exclusive custody to the mother after
noting that the father’s male partner “keeps in the bedroom he shares with the [father] pictures
of ‘drag queens’ ” and that the pictures are accessible to the children.
307. Perez, supra note 22, at 392; see also In re Darnell, 619 P.2d 1349, 1351–52 (Or. Ct.
App. 1980); In re Reesing, 483 P.2d at 873.
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to live with her husband, a transgender man, who had been the children’s
legal parent until the court terminated his parental rights.308
3. Concerns About Contagion
In other cases in our study, especially those that include a bias against ei-
ther a transitioning or cross-dressing parent, the concern is not necessarily
about the fluidity of gender expression, but rather its effect on the child. In
such situations, the parental fitness of the transgender parent is subordinated
to an almost overwhelming consideration of the effect of gender noncon-
forming behavior on the child and whether the behavior will destabilize the
child’s own gender identity as a result. One expert has explained that this
opposition to trans parenting “derives in part from concerns that the chil-
dren will become confused in their own gender identity during critical years
of psychosexual development,” noting that the “first handful of years are
seen as exceptionally vulnerable.”309
The contagion argument is not at all new in the context of sexuality.310
Kenji Yoshino has written about how since Stonewall, even as the concept of
homosexuality as a literal disease or a mental disorder began to wane, the
notion of homosexuality as a figurative disease, what he describes as a “disfa-
vored social condition that was contagious,” remained a vital presump-
tion.311 The contagion model, Nancy Knauer has written, was a theme in the
1928 obscenity trial regarding the book The Well of Loneliness by Radclyffe
Hall.312 There, the court found the work to be obscene, concluding that it
had the tendency “to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to
such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort
might fall.”313
In Knauer’s framing of the contagion model, homosexuality is a “freely
chosen vice, not a valid medical or scientific category.”314 Here, homosexuals
are thought to “prey on innocent victims,” which, as the model describes, is
especially concerning because “children or young adults[] are very easily
308. Perez, supra note 22, at 392; see also In re Darnell, 619 P.2d at 1352.
309. Green, supra note 43.
310 . See, e .g ., Richard E. Redding, It’s Really About Sex: Same-Sex Marriage, Lesbigay
Parenting, and the Psychology of Disgust, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 127, 149 (2008) (not-
ing that children of LGB parents are predicted to be more likely to engage in homosexual rela-
tionships and “to show gender nonconforming behaviors”); see also Rosky, supra note 25, at
294–311.
311. Yoshino, supra note 134, at 786.
312. Nancy J. Knauer, Homosexuality as Contagion: From The Well of Loneliness to the
Boy Scouts, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 401, 404 (2000).
313 . Id . at 404 (quoting R v. Hicklin (1868) 3 QB 360 at 369 (Eng.)). Undergirding this
conclusion, Knauer writes, lies a presumption (among others) of contagion that continues even
today, demonstrated by the Supreme Court case barring James Dale, a gay scoutmaster, from
serving as a leader in the Boy Scouts. Id . at 406–07.
314 . Id. at 406.
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lured into experimenting with homosexual practices, thereby accounting for
homosexuality’s contagious quality.”315 As Knauer writes, under this conta-
gion model, because homosexuality “can so easily infect normal people, par-
ticularly children, any public image of homosexuality that is not negative—
including simply the presence of an openly gay individual, such as an assis-
tant Scout Master or a teacher—sends a dangerous message that must be
forbidden, silenced, and repressed.”316
In the transgender context, over and over again, we see courts express-
ing significant concern regarding the effect of transition on the child’s own
gender identity.317 In the context of family court cases regarding lesbian or
gay parents, Cliff Rosky’s work has shown how concerns about contagion
regularly surface, reflecting typical stereotypes about recruitment (defined by
the risk of “indoctrinating” children) and the effect of role modeling (defined
by the risk of children “identifying” with LGB parents).318 In the transgender
parent context, the research has shown no evidence of a link between a par-
ent’s transgender identity and the child’s self-identification.319 Even when a
transgender parent is recognized for the purposes of custody or visitation,
courts often take pains to question whether the child mimics transsexual be-
havior, or whether the child’s play is consistent with their assigned sex
role.320 Again, the concern is one of contagion—the idea that the child will
reflect gender nonconforming behavior that can be attributed to the parent’s
gender dysphoria.
315 . Id .
316 . Id . at 406–07.
317. After noting that an expert testified that the child “does not mimic transsexual be-
havior, and his play is consistent with the sex roles of a male child,” and concluding “[t]here is
nothing in any of the evidence submitted to suggest that T.J. has any gender identity confu-
sion,” the court upheld the award of custody to a gender dysphoric father who decided not to
transition. In re Custody of T.J., No. C2-87-1786, 1988 WL 8302, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 9,
1988); see also M. v. M., No. FA 940064700, 1996 WL 434302, at *23 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 11,
1996).
318. Rosky, supra note 25, at 295; see also Clifford J. Rosky, Fear of the Queer Child, 61
BUFF. L. REV. 607 (2013) (providing an extensive account of the fear that exposure to homo-
sexuality will cause homosexuality in children).
319. The most recent study, published in the UK, found that out of eighteen children of
trans parents, only one child, a female, met two of the criteria for a diagnosis of gender identity
disorder, and only temporarily. According to the clinicians, by her last session at a clinic, she
no longer met these criteria, leading the clinicians to conclude that “[n]one of the children of
transsexual parents referred to the service developed any characteristics of a gender identity
disorder.” Freedman et al., supra note 223, at 428; see also Green, supra note 43.
320 . E .g ., Franklin v. Franklin, No. 602, 2014, 2015 WL 3885834, at *2 (Del. June 22,
2015) (finding evidence of contagion demonstrated by noting that a daughter once refused to
take medicine because she was afraid it would turn her into a boy, but rejecting assertion that
lower court showed anti-transgender bias when it reached conclusion that daughter showed
confusion regarding gender transition); T .J ., 1988 WL 8302, at *6–7 (awarding custody to fa-
ther who decided to maintain a male identity after finding no evidence that awareness of fa-
ther’s gender dysphoria negatively impacted child).
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In an illustrative case before the Montana Supreme Court in 1993, an ex-
spouse alleged that her husband had “in the past, cross-dressed or worn
women’s undergarments.”321 The husband began cross-dressing as a teenag-
er, but had done so always privately—in fact, not even his wife knew until
they decided to get a divorce.322 Even though the wife had never personally
observed him in female clothing, and had no other concern about his parent-
ing skills, she still wished to bring up the matter in court.323 The wife’s attor-
ney alleged that the husband’s conduct was a form of sexual deviance that
would harm the child if exposed to it, prompting the court to perform fur-
ther evaluation and to order additional consultation of the impact of the
cross-dressing behavior on the child.324
The findings led the trial court to conclude that the father’s admitted
transvestism would have an irreparably harmful impact on the child if ex-
posed to such conduct: “The court found that transvestism was compulsive
and secretive and that the couple’s son could not be protected during unsu-
pervised visitation with his father. The court found that a transvestite father
cannot be entrusted with such a tender young child.”325 The court’s findings
elaborated on the nature of the harm, observing that the mental health of the
child would be at risk if the child had been exposed to the father’s cross-
dressing because “the child would face irreparable sexual misidentification if
he saw his father as both a man and a woman.”326
Eventually, the trial court’s judgment was overturned at the state su-
preme court, which noted throughout its opinion that the district court
judge continually substituted its judgment for the findings of experts.327 The
experts, in fact, had concluded that the father’s sporadic cross-dressing did
not even qualify him to fit the medical definition of a “transvestite.”328 The
experts further believed there was only a very small chance that the son
would imitate the conduct even if exposed to the father’s cross-dressing.329
Despite the evidence, the wife’s attorney asked for additional testimony
from experts who had more experience with children.330 Another expert,
Richard Green, was summoned, this time from the staff at UCLA Medical
School.331 Here, Green assured the court that children of sexually atypical
parents do not demonstrate their own “sexual identity conflict[s].”332 The
321 . In re Marriage of D.F.D., 862 P.2d 368, 369 (Mont. 1993).
322 . Id . at 376.
323 . Id . at 372.
324 . Id . at 369–70.
325 . Id . at 370.
326 . Id .
327 . Id . at 375–77.
328 . Id . at 372–73.
329 . Id . at 373.
330 . Id . at 374.
331 . Id .
332 . Id .
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expert advised that “no cross-dressing by the husband [should] take place in
the boy’s presence for the next few formative years,” and concluded, accord-
ing to the court, that “the more time a boy can spend with his father, the
more available will be a male for appropriate sexual identification. He con-
cluded that there was no evidence that transvestism by a father affects par-
enting qualities,” nor was there a heightened risk of sexual abuse.333 More
testimony by the husband showed that “he had not cross-dressed for a year
and a half,” and he assured the court that he would never do so in the pres-
ence of his son.334
Yet despite this evidence, the district court concluded that the father was
“an admitted transvestite” (even though the expert testimony showed the
opposite) and that if the son were exposed to cross-dressing he could be ir-
reparably harmed.335 The court further concluded that transvestism was
compulsive and secretive and that there was a risk of sexual misidentification
if the child was exposed to the behavior.336 The court awarded sole custody
to the wife as a result of these findings.337
As noted above, the state supreme court reversed the trial court’s find-
ings on appeal, noting that an expert professional counselor had testified that
it was “not an issue in regard to [the husband’s] ability to parent.”338 The
court noted that that lower court had rejected all of the expert testimony
concluding that the child would not face irreparable harm, and had substi-
tuted its own judgment in finding that child’s mental health was at risk, not-
ing that this finding “was directly contrary to all of the competent evidence
in this case.”339 The court’s exchange was notable here:
THE COURT: It doesn’t mean that he is a molester, or he is a homosexual,
or he is a danger to the child?
THE WITNESS: No. Absolutely not. To me it means that he has a sexual
preference that involves wearing female’s clothing and that’s basically it.340
When asked if the child could be harmed if he inadvertently viewed the par-
ent cross-dressing, the witness replied that children could be harmed by
viewing a range of sexual activities, but that the risk was minimal here.341
Most enlightening is the husband’s testimony, in which he explained that he
had every intention to get counseling but had been unable to find a counse-
333 . Id .
334 . Id . at 375. The guardian ad litem further conducted her own investigation, noting
that the husband appeared to be able to control the behavior and that it should not disqualify
him as a custodial parent, and recommended joint physical custody for the child. Id .
335 . Id .
336 . Id .
337 . Id . at 370.
338 . Id . at 371–72, 376–77.
339 . Id . at 375.
340 . Id . at 372.
341 . Id .
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lor, that he had never cross-dressed in public, and that he “did not want his
son to do what he had done and experience the pain that had resulted from
his problem.”342 In any event, any harm that would result from observing
cross-dressing would be less than the harm from not being able to have a
normal relationship with his father, the court explained in reaching its rever-
sal.343
Again, like the previous cases, particularly at the trial court level there is
a suggestion that the cross-dressing behavior is of primary concern, even
when it is isolated and private in nature and can be shown to have no effect
on the child. Again and again, courts reinforce the notion that exposing a
child to cross-dressing behavior justifies narrowing or modifying a custody
or visitation order, jettisoning expert testimony, despite the absence of cred-
ible evidence that the exposure could have a more harmful effect on a child
than limiting the child’s relationship to their parent. This tendency only fur-
ther reifies the possibility of prejudice, leaving transgender parents at a sig-
nificant disadvantage in the judicial system.
IV. A NORMATIVE MODEL
Having looked closely at some of the ways in which courts frequently
misstep when swayed by biases against transgender parents, in this Part we
consider what approach courts should take when faced with a custody dis-
pute involving a transgender parent.344 Here, an important area of study is
not whether the transition affects the child, but rather how discrimination—
either formally at the hands of the courts or informally by another parent—
surrounding the transition affects the family.345 By flipping the concern away
from transition and toward the effect of bias surrounding the transition, we
can gain a better sense of how the law needs to evolve.346
One challenge in attempting to guide the decisionmaking process in
child custody cases is the vast discretion generally afforded to judges to de-
342 . Id . At the same time, however, the father explained that he did not want to abandon
his child, since his own father had passed away at a very young age and he had always felt a
void in his life. Id .
343 . Id . at 376.
344. Again, we use the shorthand “custody” in this Article to encompass the whole range
of disputes a court might consider involving the degree to which an adult should have parent-
ing time, decisionmaking authority, or the opportunity to preserve a legal relationship with a
child.
345 . See STOTZER ET AL., supra note 22, at 3.
346. As one expert concludes:
[A]s a matter of equity—treating people alike in relevant ways—it is unfair to re-
quire that transgender parents have children only under ideal circumstances,
when parents elsewhere have and rear children in ways that involve risks and va-
garies that emanate from disease and disorders, from unforeseeable changes in re-
lationships, and from events beyond anyone’s control.
Murphy, supra note 66, at 55.
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termine the “best interest of the child.”347 While the broad “best interest” test
laudably aims to center the needs of children, as discussed above, the test has
been criticized for permitting the subjective biases and values of a particular
judge to determine what may be best for a child. If the judge harbors anti-
transgender bias, or inadvertently may be swayed by the bias of others, the
traditional deferential approach provides little protection against that influ-
ence.
Consequently, we conclude that the only way to ensure that anti-
transgender bias does not affect decisionmaking348 is to expressly exclude the
consideration of that factor. Leading authorities have taken or recommended
the same approach with respect to other parental characteristics—such as
race and sexual orientation—that are unlikely to have any genuine connec-
tion to a person’s ability to be a good parent, but that at the same time pose a
serious risk of distorting the judicial process by triggering conscious or un-
conscious bias on the part of decisionmakers.349 We additionally propose
that courts should be barred from considering specific factors that are com-
monly used as proxies for transgender status, such as the possibility of a
child being bullied by peers because a parent is transgender.
A. Constitutional Considerations
To begin, the constitutional rights of adults to parent their children
without the interference of the state are well established.350 Parenting has
long been considered a fundamental right—a right so foundational that it
347 . See supra Section II.0.
348. To be sure, no rule can entirely guarantee bias will not sneak into a judge’s decision,
but clear rules can at least help improve the odds. See Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and
Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 720–21 (2006).
349. In this respect, it is similar to the constitutional notion of a suspect classification, but
adoption of this test would not be dependent upon a constitutional analysis. As discussed be-
low, that is because biased judicial decisionmaking not only interferes with the rights of the
transgender parent but also undermines the interests of the children of transgender parents.
350. Of course, these standards are not always evenly applied. It is important to note that
evidence shows a substantial divergence from these legal standards in the reported experiences
of lower income parents and women of color, who are often subjected to higher degrees of
state interference and surveillance in birthing and parenting. See, e .g ., KHIARA M. BRIDGES,
THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS (2017) (arguing that lower income women are denied the
same privacy rights that many others enjoy); Candra Bullock, Comment, Low-Income Parents
Victimized by Child Protective Services, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 1023 (2003) (not-
ing that lower income families are more likely to be reported to child protective services).
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cannot be abrogated without a showing of a compelling state interest.351 In-
deed, in Santosky v . Kramer,352 the Court observed:
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the
State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital in-
terest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.353
Courts have long recognized the fundamental right to direct the up-
bringing of one’s children,354 along with the right to maintain parental status
absent a compelling showing of harm.355 Laws that disproportionately re-
strict the parental rights of unwed fathers, for instance, have been held to vi-
olate both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.356 Similarly, courts are increasingly recognizing that
transgender people have a fundamental right to be themselves and to live in
accordance with their gender identity.357
That principle is reflected in antidiscrimination laws that either explicit-
ly or implicitly protect transgender people from discrimination in employ-
ment, housing, public accommodations, and other contexts. Explicit
protections include those found in the twenty states that have adopted anti-
discrimination laws that bar discrimination based on gender identity or ex-
351 . See Brinig, supra note 117, at 1350 (citing a long list of cases); see also Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (describing the “primary role” of parents in raising
their children as “an enduring American tradition”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) (recognizing a “private realm of family life”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (describing the right of parents to raise children “as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men”).
352. 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that there must be clear and convincing evidence be-
fore terminating a parent’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
353 . Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
354 . See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972) (recognizing fundamental nature of “the interest of a parent in the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her children”).
355 . See Santosky, 455 U.S. 745; In re Heather B., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 891, 904 (Ct. App.
1992) (noting that it is “settled that a state cannot terminate a parental relationship based solely
upon the ‘best interests’ of the child without some showing of parental unfitness”); see also Da-
vid D. Meyer, The Constitutionality of “Best Interests” Parentage, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
857, 881 (2006).
356 . Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649 (holding that a state law that discriminated against unwed
fathers violated due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1698 (2017) (holding that a federal law that dis-
criminated against unwed fathers violated equal protection principle of the Fifth Amendment).
357 . See, e .g ., Arroyo Gonzales v. Rossello Nevares, 305 F. Supp. 3d 327 (D.P.R. 2018)
(holding that Puerto Rico’s policy barring transgender people from correcting the gender
marker on birth certificates violated the fundamental rights to privacy and autonomy). Flynn
has argued that “[t]he determination of legal sex should be considered within the context of
our constitutional values—values that reflect a deep suspicion of governmental intrusion on
individual rights.” Flynn, supra note 22, at 34.
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pression358 and the state and federal laws and regulations that provide
transgender people the ability to obtain identification documents that accu-
rately reflect the person’s true identity.359
Implicit protections include those flowing from the state and federal
laws that protect every person in the country from discrimination based on
sex360 and disability.361 At least half of the federal circuit courts of appeals
have now recognized that sex discrimination laws bar discrimination against
those who are perceived to transgress gender stereotypes, including
transgender people,362 an issue that the Supreme Court will consider in the
2019–2020 term.363 More recently, courts and administrative agencies across
the country have interpreted laws against sex discrimination not only to bar
discrimination but more specifically to guarantee the right of a transgender
person to be recognized and treated as a member of the sex with which they
identify, in contexts ranging from dress codes364 to single-sex facilities like
bathrooms365 and locker rooms.366 Nondiscrimination laws and principles
are also increasingly interpreted to guarantee the right to gender transition,
such as through medical treatments relating to gender transition367 or access
to accurate identity documents.368
Federal courts have also begun to recognize that the rights of
transgender people are protected by the Constitution. The guarantee of equal
protection prohibits the government from discriminating against groups
that have historically been the subject of bias without a compelling justifica-
tion.369 Though the question has not reached the Supreme Court, lower
courts are increasingly concluding that discrimination against transgender
people should receive heightened scrutiny, either as a form of discrimination
based on sex370 or as its own suspect or quasi-suspect classification.371 Apply-
358. 1 SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 13, § 10:7.
359 . Id . § 10:11.
360 . See Brenda D. Alzadon et al., Sexual Harassment, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 583, 586–92
(2000).
361. 1 SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 13, § 10:6.
362 . Id . § 10:5.
363 . EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 577 (6th Cir. 2018),
cert . granted, No. 18-107, 2019 WL 1756679 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2019).
364 . See, e .g ., id .
365 . E .g ., Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th
Cir. 2017).
366 . See, e .g ., M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 718 (D. Md. 2018).
367 . E .g ., Nondiscrimination in Health Programs or Activities, 45 C.F.R. § 92 (2016).
368 . E .g ., F.V. v. Barron, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (D. Idaho 2018) (holding that Idaho policy
barring transgender people from amending birth certificates but permitting others, such as
adoptive parents, to amend birth certificates violated equal protection).
369. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
370 . E .g ., Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1034; Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir.
2011).
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ing the traditional four-factor test for determining whether a group is enti-
tled to heightened scrutiny, those courts have found that transgender people:
(1) have “been historically ‘subjected to discrimination’ ”;372 (2) “ha[ve] a de-
fining characteristic that ‘frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society’ ”;373 (3) “exhibit immutable or distinguishing charac-
teristics that define them as a discrete group”;374 and (4) “as a class, . . . are a
minority with relatively little political power.”375 As a result, any government
action that penalizes a person based on their transgender status should be
subject to strict, or at least intermediate, scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.
The Supreme Court’s gay rights jurisprudence since Lawrence v . Texas
has also suggested that the liberty interest encompassed within due process
protects a person’s right to live in accordance with their identity, including
as an LGBT person, without interference or punishment from the state.376 As
commentators have noted, that jurisprudence sometimes blurs the lines be-
tween the equal protection and due process guarantees,377 but under either
formulation a person’s right to be themselves is protected against those who
would condition equal treatment on going back in the closet. Along these
lines, lower courts have held that denying transgender people accurate gov-
371 . E .g ., Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d. 730 (E.D. Va. 2018);
M .A .B ., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 719; F .V ., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 1145; Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d
747, 768 (D. Md. 2017), appeal dismissed, No. 17-2398, 2018 WL 2717050 (4th Cir. Feb. 2,
2018); Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850 (S.D. Ohio 2016), denying stay
pending appeal sub nom, Dodds v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 845 F.3d 217 (6th Cir. 2016); Norswor-
thy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F.
Supp. 3d 134, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
372. Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288 (W.D. Pa. 2017)
(quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986)).
373 . Id . (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985)).
374 . Id .; see also Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (defin-
ing as “immutable” those traits, including gender identity, that are “so fundamental to one’s
identity that a person should not be required to abandon them”). It is, however, important to
note that there have been many powerful critiques of immutability as applied to matters of
sexual and gender identity. See, e .g ., Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2
(2015); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argu-
ment from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 507 (1994).
375 . Evancho, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 288.
376. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015) (holding that the liberty protected
by the Constitution includes “intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs”); Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” (quoting
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992))); see also Weisberger v.
Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265, 275 (App. Div. 2017) (holding, in a case involving a religious fa-
ther who sought to deny custody to his lesbian former wife, that a divorce agreement will not
be interpreted in a way that “violates a parent’s legitimate due process right to express oneself
and live freely” (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574, and Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584)).
377 . See, e .g ., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 776–81
(2011).
June 2019] Transparenthood 1653
ernment-issued IDs impermissibly restricts their due process rights to priva-
cy and autonomy.378 Moreover, limiting a trans person’s ability to live in ac-
cordance with their gender identity may also infringe the First Amendment
right to expression.379
Considering a parent’s transgender status or gender expression in a cus-
tody determination thus raises serious constitutional concerns. Regardless of
the level of scrutiny that courts ultimately agree transgender people are enti-
tled to, it is clear, to us, that relying on a parent’s gender identity or expres-
sion to deny or limit custody or visitation cannot pass constitutional
muster.380 The intermediate scrutiny test demands “an ‘exceedingly persua-
sive justification’ ” for discrimination based on gender.381 Under the strict
scrutiny test, the fit between means and ends must be even tighter; the dis-
crimination must be “necessary” to the accomplishment of the government’s
goal.382
In Palmore v . Sidoti, the Supreme Court held that the goal of granting
custody based on a child’s best interests is “indisputably a substantial gov-
ernmental interest” under the equal protection analysis.383 Nonetheless, the
Court concluded that the lower court’s ruling—denying custody to a white
mother because she was living with a black man—was not permissible.384
The Court reached this conclusion despite its acknowledgment that a child
living in a mixed-race household might face disapproval from others in the
community and that such bias could subject the child to harmful pressures
and stresses that would not exist if the child were living with parents of the
same race.385 The Court concluded that while “[t]he Constitution cannot
control such prejudices[,] . . . neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may
be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect.”386
378. Arroyo Gonzalez v. Rossello Nevares, 305 F. Supp. 3d 327, 333 (D.P.R. 2018); Love
v. Johnson, 146 F. Supp. 3d 848, 856 (E.D. Mich. 2015); see also Beatie v. Beatie, 333 P.3d 754,
759 n.10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that barring a transgender man from legal gender
change because he had previously given birth would violate the fundamental right to procrea-
tion).
379 . See, e .g ., Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2017 WL 6311305, at *9 (W.D.
Wash. Dec. 11, 2017) (granting preliminary injunction of President Trump’s ban on open mili-
tary service by transgender people, on First Amendment grounds), stay granted, No. 18A625,
2019 WL 271944 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2019).
380. Carlos A. Ball, Lesbian and Gay Families: Gender Nonconformity and the Implica-
tions of Difference, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 691, 726–30 (2003); see Cohen, supra note 22, at 536,
556–57.
381. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017) (quoting United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
382 . See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984).
383 . Id . at 433.
384 . Id . at 431–33.
385 . Id . at 433.
386 . Id . It is important to note however, that Palmore’s observations have not always
been followed. In powerful work, Katie Eyer and Melissa Murray (among others) have shown
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Even under intermediate scrutiny, a court would have to show an “ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification” for relying on a parent’s transgender sta-
tus to deny custody or visitation. Generalizations and stereotypes about
transgender people, or fears stemming from the biases of others, cannot
plausibly justify making custody decisions on any basis other than a person’s
ability to be a good parent.387
In fact, because of the danger that bias can infect and undermine a deci-
sionmaker’s ability to effectively focus on the child’s ultimate long-term in-
terest, allowing courts to consider a parent’s transgender status should fail
even the rational basis test. Under any standard, considering a parent’s
transgender status in custody cases should be constitutionally impermissible.
B. Policy Interests
As compelling as the constitutional arguments may be, in practice,
courts often seem unpersuaded by such considerations in custody decisions
outside the narrow area of racial discrimination.388 In the more than thirty
years since the Supreme Court’s decision in Palmore, the Court has not ex-
panded that holding to prohibit or limit consideration of characteristics oth-
er than race, even though the consideration of those characteristics carries a
similar risk of being influenced by impermissible bias. In the absence of such
an unmistakable prohibition, as other scholars have noted, courts generally
give little weight to constitutional considerations in custody determina-
tions.389 While decisions may give a passing nod to the rights of parents, in
practice, judges tend to conclude that their own perception of the child’s best
interest outweighs just about any other consideration, even a serious in-
fringement of a parent’s constitutional rights.390
that, at times, race has been considered in decisionmaking regarding the family. See, e .g ., Katie
Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 537 (2014); Melissa
Murray, Loving’s Legacy: Decriminalization and the Regulation of Sex and Sexuality, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 2671 (2018).
387 . Cf . Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (holding that generalizations
about unwed fathers cannot justify discrimination).
388 . See Polikoff, supra note 135, at 229 (concluding that, in general, “when a child’s het-
erosexual parent has challenged the exercise of custody or visitation by a parent who has come
out as gay or lesbian, the gay or lesbian parent’s assertion of a constitutional right has amount-
ed to nothing”).
389 . See id . at 228–29.
390 . See, e .g ., Tipsword v. Tipsword, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0066, 2013 WL 1320444, at *2
(Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2013) (holding that “a parent’s conduct attendant to his or her gender
transition [that] harms the parent-child relationship” is a legitimate consideration, and deny-
ing custody to the transgender parent, despite recognizing that the Constitution forbids con-
sideration of “societal prejudice” relating to a parent’s transgender status). But see, e .g .,
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 382 S.W.3d 892, 899 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that the trial court vio-
lated a lesbian mother’s “due process, equal protection, and fundamental right to parent her
children” when it relied on her sexual orientation as a “determinative factor” in awarding sole
custody to the father).
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Fortunately, the Constitution isn’t the only limiting principle when it
comes to custody decisionmaking. In fact, the factors that courts already
consider as part of the best interest analysis—that is, children’s own inter-
ests—also support such a limitation. We argue that courts and legislatures
seeking to promote children’s best interests should prioritize the mainte-
nance of parent–child bonds, which is undoubtedly in the child’s own inter-
ests regardless of a parent’s gender identity or expression.
As discussed in Part I, the reality is that hundreds of thousands of
transgender people across the United States and the world are living in fami-
lies and raising children related by blood, adoption, or other forms of formal
and informal kinship.391 Any approach should be grounded in that reality
and not in fears that are based on the inaccurate perception that a
transgender parent is sui generis or even an impossibility.392
We propose centering two policy goals that we contend are undeniably
supported by the social science evidence.393 The first is that children are gen-
erally best off when they are supported in maintaining close relationships
with the adults they know as their parents.394 This interest is reflected in vir-
tually all statutes listing factors to be considered in determining custody and
parenting time arrangements.395 Many states have even adopted so-called
“friendly parent” provisions that call on courts to consider “[w]hich parent is
more likely to allow the child frequent, meaningful and continuing contact
with the other parent”396 (although those have faced scrutiny in recent years
by domestic violence advocates as going too far in restricting the ability of a
battered spouse to protect a child from an abusive parent).397
The second is that transgender people (like all people) are generally best
off when they don’t have to hide or feel ashamed of who they are; that is,
when they are supported in transitioning to be able to live consistent with
their gender identity. Research shows that transition is the most effective—
391 . See JAMES ET AL., supra note 41, at 68; STOTZER ET AL., supra note 22, at 2–5.
392 . See Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (quoting Nancy D. Polikoff,
This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in
Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 469 (1990)) (holding that
courts should not “perpetuate the fiction of family homogeneity at the expense of the children
whose reality does not fit this form”).
393. Courts and legislatures properly consider social science research as part of the broad
range of materials that can be relevant to determining what decision is likely to lead to the best
developmental outcome for a child. See, e .g ., Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of So-
cial Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV.
107 (1987) (critiquing what the authors view as overreliance on such data).
394. Catherine M. Lee & Karen A. Bax, Children’s Reactions to Parental Separation and
Divorce, 5 PAEDIATRICS & CHILD HEALTH 217 (2000).
395 . See Michael S. Wald, Adults’ Sexual Orientation and State Determinations Regarding
Placement of Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 381, 424 (2006).
396. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(A)(6) (2017).
397 . See Elrod & Dale, supra note 128, at 394–96.
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indeed, the only effective—treatment for gender dysphoria.398 Similarly,
maintaining close family relationships can be a critical factor in the well-
being of transgender people, as family rejection is tied to a host of negative
consequences.399
For families with transgender parents, those two goals fit neatly togeth-
er: when parents are given the freedom to live in accordance with who they
are, they are happier and healthier. It hardly requires research to recognize
that happier and healthier parents are better for kids. If we are to prioritize
the well-established principle of maintaining children’s relationships with
parental figures, we should do whatever we can to give those adults the sup-
port they need to be the happiest and healthiest parents they can be. That
will ultimately serve the best interest of that child and all the other children
living in families that include a transgender person. Those children deserve
to live free of stigma and fear, too.400
A rule that disallows consideration of a parent’s gender identity or ex-
pression is the only approach that meets both of those goals, ensuring that
children have permanent relationships with adults who are well equipped to
love and support them. Conversely, an approach that grants courts unfet-
tered discretion to consider factors based in bias thinly disguised as neutrali-
ty is likely to incentivize patently harmful results: emboldening non-
transgender parents experiencing normal tension post-breakup to seize on a
former partner’s trans status as an opportunity to wrest sole control away
from the other parent; encouraging trans parents to live in secrecy or post-
pone transition for fear of losing their children; and, ironically, increasing
the stigma and fear associated with having a transgender parent, to the det-
riment of both the parent and the child, and to the benefit of no one.401
Constitutional arguments are not the only avenue, therefore, to achieve
the goal we argue should be prioritized. The ordinary best interest analysis
can itself, in theory, protect and support the ability of a child to maintain a
relationship with a transgender parent. For consideration of illegitimate fac-
tors ultimately undermines the best interests of a child with a transgender
parent.
398 . See Bd. of Trs., Am. Med. Ass’n, Conforming Birth Certificate Policies to Current
Medical Standards for Transgender Patients, 163 AM. MED. ASS’N PROC. 95, 96 (2014).
399. JAMES ET AL., supra note 41, at 65.
400 . Cf . United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (invalidating a federal law
barring recognition of same-sex marriages because that law “tells those couples, and all the
world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal recognition. . . . The differ-
entiation demeans the couple . . . [a]nd it humiliates tens of thousands of children now being
raised by same-sex couples. The law in question makes it even more difficult for the children to
understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families
in their community and in their daily lives.”).
401 . See Wald, supra note 395, at 424–25.
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C. Limitations of the Nexus Test
In looking for possible rules that could be adopted to ensure that courts
do not unfairly penalize transgender parents, the nexus test might seem an
obvious candidate.402 As discussed above, the nexus test was originally
viewed as welcome progress from the older per se test that uniformly denied
custody to LGBT parents.403 And it has often served its purpose, providing a
framework for courts to appropriately reject efforts to remove a child from
the custody of a trans or gay parent.
For example, in Christian v . Randall, the Colorado Court of Appeals
overturned a lower court decision that had taken away custody from a
transgender parent who had transitioned to male.404 The appeals court noted
that the evidence below showed “that the children were happy, healthy, well-
adjusted children who were doing well in school and who were active in
community activities.”405 There was zero evidence that the home environ-
ment “endangered the children’s physical health or impaired their emotional
development.”406
Nonetheless, the trial judge had ruled that the children should be re-
moved, basing its decision “solely on th[e] ground” that the parent was “go-
ing through a transsexual change.”407 The appellate court held that the lower
court’s decision violated the state statute that codified a version of the nexus
test, which provided that, in determining best interests, “[t]he court shall
not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his rela-
tionship with the child.”408 Since the record indicated that the parent’s
transgender status “did not adversely affect respondent’s relationship with
the children nor impair their emotional development,” the decision to
change custody was overturned.409 Indeed, Christian serves as an early and
powerful reminder that it is possible for courts to look beyond the issue of
transition and to focus primarily on questions of parenting instead.
In other cases, however, even when courts purport to apply the nexus
test, they actually apply that test in a distorted fashion to justify the exact
same outcome as a blanket ban: denying an LGBT parent custody of their
402 . See, e .g ., Chang, supra note 22, at 697 (arguing that “a parent’s gender status should
be merely one of many factors to be balanced—not the ultimate determinant”); Carter, supra
note 22, at 235 (arguing that “the most important issue” for courts in cases involving
transgender parents and child custody is “[e]valuation of the effect of a parent’s gender identity
upon a child,” rather than the parent’s gender identity alone).
403 . See supra Section II.B.
404. 516 P.2d 132, 132 (Colo. App. 1973). For a longer discussion of this case, see BALL,
supra note 22, at 193–95.
405 . Christian, 516 P.2d at 133.
406 . Id .
407 . Id . at 134.
408 . Id . (emphasis added) (quoting Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, ch. 130, § 46-
1-24(2), 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 520, 530).
409 . Id .
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child based only on fears and stereotypes tied directly to the parent’s status.
As noted in Section III.B, potential harms that have been found sufficient to
justify ending or limiting a transgender parent’s contact with a child under a
purported nexus test include the fear of contagion of gender nonconformi-
ty;410 the parent’s exercise of the supposedly-volitional “choice” to transition
or express their gender, including presumptions of selfishness411 and distrac-
tion;412 a presumption of instability;413 the specter of an inherent connection
to sexuality;414 a child’s (potential) anxiety around transition and loss;415 and
the risk of stigma from being associated with a trans person.416 While those
harms were previously recited in support of a per se rule, once that kind of
blanket rule fell out of fashion, they were simply repackaged as an acceptable
part of the analysis under the nexus test.
Indeed, in the case of Suzanne Daly, the Nevada Supreme Court pur-
ported to apply a version of the nexus test to uphold the termination of the
transgender parent’s rights based on the lower court’s specific factual find-
ings formed by its “careful[] consider[ation] [of] the record.”417 That sup-
posedly objective review of the evidence “found abandonment and risk of
serious mental and emotional harm” and compelled the conclusion that Su-
zanne was “a selfish person whose own needs, desires and wishes were par-
amount and were indulged without regard to their impact” on her child.418
As discussed in Part III, closer inspection reveals that those conclusions,
supposedly based in record evidence, were in fact a barely disguised stand-in
for Suzanne’s trans status.
Scholars like Michael Wald and Nancy Polikoff have criticized the nexus
test as applied to cases involving lesbian, gay, or bisexual parents or parents
who live with an unmarried partner.419 While the test is certainly an im-
provement on a per se prohibition or presumption of unfitness, Wald and
Polikoff point out that the nexus test is unnecessary to advance any reasona-
ble goals and may even contribute to significant harm.420 As Polikoff ex-
410. B. v. B., 585 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (App. Div. 1992) (denying overnight visitation to cross-
dressing father due to concerns about its effect on the “impressionable” five-year-old child).
411. Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 59 (Nev. 1986).
412. Tipsword v. Tipsword, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0066, 2013 WL 1320444, at *3 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Apr. 2, 2013).
413. Magnuson v. Magnuson, 170 P.3d 65, 66–67 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). For a longer
discussion of this case, see BALL, supra note 22 at 195–97 (“[D]espite the appellate court’s pro-
testations to the contrary, it ended up essentially applying a per se standard by approving the
lower court’s view that the mere decision to transition . . . constituted evidence of parental in-
stability.”).
414. Cisek v. Cisek, No. 80 C.A. 113, 1982 WL 6161, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 1982).
415. M.B. v. D.W., 236 S.W.3d 31, 35–36 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).
416 . Id .
417. Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 59 (Nev. 1986).
418 . Id .
419. Polikoff, supra note 135, at 237; Wald, supra note 395, at 427.
420. Polikoff, supra note 135, at 237; Wald, supra note 395, at 427.
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plains, the fundamental premise of the nexus test is mistaken, because “a
parent’s sexual orientation, in and of itself, can never have an adverse impact
on a child.”421 Any parent, including a gay or lesbian parent, might fall short:
A parent might not pay sufficient attention to a child’s needs and feelings
or might choose a new partner who treats a child poorly. These could have
an adverse impact on the child. But neither has anything to do with wheth-
er the parent is gay or straight, married or not.422
Polikoff asserts that courts have ample authority to identify and prevent po-
tential harm to children whenever they see it, within their existing general
authority to protect the best interests of children, without the need to resort
to referencing a parent’s sexual orientation or the nonmarital character of
the parents’ relationship.423
Such plain logic makes clear that a special nexus test for unpopular pa-
rental characteristics is unnecessary surplusage. Worse still, Wald and Poli-
koff each point out ways that the nexus test is in fact harmful. Wald makes
an exhaustive study of social science research and concludes that “it is almost
always detrimental to children if decisionmakers consider an adult’s sexual
orientation when making placement decisions.”424 Yet, as Polikoff explains,
the nexus test by its very framing “implies that a child might be uniquely
harmed because a parent is gay or lesbian.”425 Such a rule singles out sexual
orientation, or gender identity, “as though that factor requires special moni-
toring by a court,”426 which it does not, and essentially invites courts to look
closer for possible signs of harm.
As discussed, courts regularly misuse the nexus test to deny custody or
visitation to LGBT parents by relying on supposedly neutral factors, such as
the risk of stigma, that are in fact stand-ins for LGBT status per se.427 Beyond
the obvious unfairness of that type of discrimination to transgender parents
and children of transgender parents, which is worthy of serious considera-
tion by courts and legislatures,428 Wald identifies a number of other negative
policy outcomes that necessarily result from such a regime. For example, by
setting out the possibility of a public spectacle that would drag the child into
the conflict and force them to take sides, such a rule incentivizes the non-
LGBT parent to bargain aggressively for restrictions on the other parent’s
421. Polikoff, supra note 135, at 237.
422 . Id .
423 . See id .
424. Wald, supra note 395, at 383.
425. Polikoff, supra note 135, at 238–39.
426 . Id . at 238; see also Kim, supra note 133, at 58 (explaining how the nexus test “pro-
jects the message that the sexuality of sexually nonconforming parents requires special scruti-
ny”).
427 . See, e .g ., S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
428. Wald, supra note 395, at 409–10.
1660 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:1593
quality or quantity of time with the child,429 or instead to take the chance of
pressuring a child to take a side in the conflict, knowing that they have a
higher possibility of succeeding based on a court’s potential bias against the
other parent.430 This risk is a particular concern in cases involving a breakup
between an LGBT and a non-LGBT parent, where deep conflict may be es-
pecially prevalent due to highly negative feelings of abandonment, betrayal,
and embarrassment that the non-LGBT parent might have in connection
with the newly revealed sexual orientation or gender identity of their former
partner.431
More fundamentally, Wald points out that the nexus test simply pro-
vides an insufficient bulwark against bias infiltrating decisionmaking in cas-
es involving LGBT parents, which leads to bad decisions for children. When
judges are focused on irrelevant characteristics, like the morality or pre-
sumed inherent harm from a parent’s identity, it is likely that they will ig-
nore or place incorrect weight on the other factors that are of genuine
importance to the child’s well-being.432 Wald notes the overwhelming re-
search concluding that the most critical predictive factor for the child’s well-
being is the nature of the child’s relationship with each parent.433 It is there-
fore essential for courts to maintain focus on that relationship in all deci-
sions involving custody of a child.434
429 . Id . at 424 (citing Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 121). One illustration of this
type of bargaining is seen in the 2015 film Carol and the 1952 novel it is based on, The Price of
Salt. Carol, a mother going through a divorce, knows that she will lose custody of her young
daughter if her husband informs the court of her sexual relationship with another woman. She
therefore agrees to give him full custody and to receive severely restricted supervised visitation
(“she can come and visit me a couple of afternoons a year”), knowing that is the best outcome
she can hope for. Today this penalty strikes audiences as shocking; in 1952 it was a standard
(indeed, mild) consequence for a character’s unrepentant queerness. PATRICIA HIGHSMITH
[CLAIRE MORGAN], THE PRICE OF SALT (Leslie Parr ed., Arno Press Inc. 1975) (1952).
430. Wald, supra note 395, at 424, 426, 427; see, e .g ., Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d
831, 834–35 (N.D. 1993) (declining to overturn a lower court’s denial of custody to the lesbian
mother because, while recognizing that a parent has a duty not to intentionally alienate a child
from the other parent, the court determined that the father’s assertion to the children that ho-
mosexuality is deviant and not to be tolerated was not relevant, since homophobic views are
widespread in society).
431. Wald, supra note 395, at 424–26.
432 . Id . at 425.
433 . Id . at 428 (citing a panel of the leading national experts on child custody that con-
cluded that “a parent’s competence to provide a child all the food, clothing, shelter, and physi-
cal, educational, and emotional nurturance a child needs cannot possibly be measured by the
parent’s sexual practices or gender preferences” and that “how the parent deals with the child is
all that matters” (quoting NAT’L INTERDISCIPLINARY COLLOQUIUM ON CHILD CUSTODY LAW,
LEGAL AND MENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD CUSTODY LAW: A DESKBOOK FOR
JUDGES § 3:8 (Robert J. Levy ed., 1998))).
434 . Id . at 425.
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D. Beyond the Nexus Test: Bar Any Consideration of a Parent’s Status or
Related Factors
We have now identified several approaches that are either outright
harmful (i.e., a per se ban or presumption of unfitness) or that, while well-
intended, can have serious unintended harmful consequences (i.e., the nexus
test). What other options might there be to more effectively guide or limit
courts when considering custody determinations where one parent is
transgender or gender nonconforming?
The most thoughtful recent court decisions considering cases involving
LGB parents have emphasized the importance of “neutrality” with respect to
a parent’s sexual orientation in a way that pushes the nexus test closer to the
outright bar of Palmore.435 For example, a 2017 decision, In re Marriage of
Black, overturned a lower court decision that had given the father primary
custody in part because the mother was a lesbian.436 In that case, the lower
court ruled that the father “is clearly the more stable parent” because he
would maintain their strict religious upbringing, which would be in conflict
with the mother’s homosexuality.437 The Washington Supreme Court held
that this “reasoning unfairly punishes a parent . . . on the basis of her sexual
orientation,”438 which it noted is constitutionally suspect.439 Rather, the court
held that “courts must remain neutral toward a parent’s sexual orientation in
order to ensure that custody decisions are based on the ‘needs of the child
rather than the sexual preferences of the parent.’ ”440
The state’s high court found that the lower court’s consideration of fac-
tors connected to the mother’s sexual orientation—including the possibility
that the children would be uncomfortable with the mother’s homosexuality
and the risk that they could experience bullying as a result of the mother’s
relationship with a woman—was inappropriate and indicative of bias, citing
435 . E .g ., In re Marriage of Black, 392 P.3d 1041, 1050 (Wash. 2017) (holding that “courts
must remain neutral toward a parent’s sexual orientation in order to ensure that custody deci-
sions are based on the ‘needs of the child rather than the sexual preferences of the parent’ ”
(quoting In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (Wash. 1983))); Weisberger v.
Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265, 273–74 (App. Div. 2017) (“[T]o the extent the mother’s sexual
orientation was raised at the hearing, we note that courts must remain neutral toward such
matters.” (citing Black, 392 P.3d at 1049–50)). Note, however, that courts have interpreted
Palmore unevenly, at times taking race into account. See Murray, supra note 386, at 2691–93
(reaching this observation).
436. 392 P.3d 1041.
437 . Black, 392 P.3d at 1047.
438 . Id . at 1050.
439 . Id . at 1049 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), and SmithKline Bee-
cham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that sexual orientation clas-
sifications receive heightened scrutiny)).
440 . Id . at 1050 (quoting In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886 (Wash. 1983)). The
court noted that Washington courts follow an analogous rule of “strict impartiality” in regard
to parents’ conflicting religious beliefs. Id .
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Palmore.441 The Washington Supreme Court acknowledged that under the
nexus test, courts may consider a parent’s sexual orientation where there is
“an express showing of direct harm.”442 But it clarified that even under that
test, any evidence that relies on an “assumption that a parent’s sexual orien-
tation is inherently harmful to his or her children” is not a valid factor for
consideration because it is not in fact neutral.443
We believe that, even at its best, the nexus test is inherently flawed and
confusing. Courts that seek to adhere to a standard of strict neutrality can
still be misled under the nexus test by claims of harm that are in fact mere
restatements of the parent’s orientation. The most straightforward approach
would be to simply prohibit courts from considering a parent’s sexual orien-
tation or transgender status. Carl Schneider, who has argued persuasively in
defense of the broad discretion generally granted to courts under the best in-
terest test, has noted that any danger of improper bias could most easily be
addressed through “direct prohibitions” of consideration of particular fac-
tors, as in the prohibition of the consideration of race that the Supreme
Court adopted in Palmore.444 This is the basic approach proposed by Wald,
who argues that in custody determinations, “a parent’s sexual orientation
should be irrelevant.”445 Polikoff adopts Wald’s reasoning and goes slightly
further, suggesting that courts should be barred entirely from considering
the nonmarital nature of a parent’s relationship.446
The American Law Institute (ALI) has already proposed something sim-
ilar with respect to the sexual orientation of a parent. In its 2002 Principles of
the Law of Family Dissolution, the ALI set forth a strict black-letter rule:
In issuing orders under this Chapter [concerning custody or visitation], the
court should not consider any of the following factors: (a) the race or eth-
nicity of the child, a parent, or other member of the household; (b) the sex
of a parent or the child; . . . [or] (d) the sexual orientation of a parent . . . .447
In the official comments, the ALI explains:
441 . Id . at 1051.
442 . Id . at 1050.
443 . Id . at 1050 n.9.
444. Schneider, supra note 117, at 2268, 2296; see also Jennifer Ann Drobac, Note, For the
Sake of the Children: Court Consideration of Religion in Child Custody Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1609, 1611–12 (1998) (applying Schneider’s suggestion to propose barring courts from im-
properly considering a parent’s religion).
445. Wald, supra note 395, at 383. Wald’s formulation would include the caveat that sex-
ual orientation can be considered “where an older child indicates that the parent’s sexual ori-
entation is relevant to them,” although that exception would also apply to any reasoning
expressed by an older child, and it does not require a special “gay-only” exception. Id . at 383,
430. A better formulation of Wald’s exception, then, would not even reference sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity, but simply would provide that an older child’s wishes receive a certain
level of deference.
446. Polikoff, supra note 135, at 237.
447. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.12(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2002).
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All stereotypes should be avoided in decisionmaking under this Chapter,
including those based on many factors not covered by this section such as
disability, age, intelligence level, personality, and appearance. The section
singles out race, ethnicity, sex, religion, sexual orientation, extramarital
conduct, and financial circumstances because these factors historically have
created the most troublesome distortions in judgments about what is best
for a child, and thus require the greatest vigilance to avoid.448
As we have argued in this Article, a parent’s gender identity or gender
expression is well suited to be added to that list of forbidden factors in judi-
cial decisionmaking about custody or visitation. As with other illegitimate
considerations like race, ethnicity, sex, and sexual orientation, an outright
prohibition is essential to get to the root of the problem because gender non-
conformity has no relevance to a person’s ability to be a good parent for a
child. And yet because of continued widespread implicit bias, a high risk ex-
ists that courts will—intentionally or not—be swayed by such bias. The only
sure way to guarantee that bias will not infect a decision is to prohibit con-
sideration of a parental characteristic that in fact bears no relation to good
parenting.449
It is true that in the nearly two decades since the ALI Principles were
published, their impact has been surprisingly limited. No state has adopted
any version of Section 2.12450 (although, as noted earlier, Washington, D.C.
does have a statute prohibiting courts from making decisions based solely on
sexual orientation).451 Some court decisions have acknowledged the ALI’s
recommendations, however,452 and the recommendations may receive more
attention as broader recognition of the humanity of LGBT people continues
to grow.
Our proposal would go even further than the ALI’s prohibition, though.
Where the risk that bias will unintentionally and inappropriately seep into
decisionmaking is so great, an even stricter guard is necessary: courts should
also be expressly barred from considering specific illegitimate factors that are
frequently used as stand-ins for transgender (or LGB) status. As discussed
above, those include: the fear that a child will become gender nonconform-
ing or gay;453 the potential stigma of association with a trans person; the par-
448 . Id . § 2.12(1) cmt. a.
449 . See Schneider, supra note 117, at 2298.
450 . See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.12 Reporter’s Notes cmt. a.
451. D.C. CODE § 16–914(a)(1)(A) (2018).
452 . E .g ., Tipsword v. Tipsword, No. 1CA-CV-12-0066, 2013 WL 1320444, at *2–3 (Ariz.
Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2013) (citing the ALI Principles in acknowledging that “[t]he bare fact that a
parent is transgender” is not a relevant consideration, but concluding that the transgender par-
ent’s “conduct” in relation to her transition was reason enough to deny her custody); Woods v.
Ryan, 696 N.W.2d 508, 518 (N.D. 2005) (Maring, J., dissenting) (citing the ALI Principles in
acknowledging that courts should not generally consider a parent’s financial circumstances in
custody decisions).
453 . See, e .g ., In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (imposing
strict limitations on visitation with gay father in part based on expert testimony that “the fa-
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ent’s openness (lack of “discretion”) about their gender nonconformity; the
fact of transition and the changes it may bring; a transgender parent’s pre-
sumed instability, selfishness, or distraction; and a child’s anxiety around
transition or preference to avoid a trans parent. Consideration of those fac-
tors should be expressly disallowed in cases involving a trans parent because
they have little meaning separate from the illegitimate consideration of a
parent’s trans status and, in almost any case involving a trans parent, a court
could imagine those factors lurking in the corners. Allowing them to be con-
sidered creates too great a risk that courts will rely on stereotypes and fears
that do not in fact support the best interest of the child.
This is not an entirely novel concept, as many contexts recognize the
dangers posed by implicit bias. Just this year, Washington State adopted a
rule banning “implicit, institutional and unconscious” racial and ethnic bias
in the process of jury selection.454 In other contexts, evidence of cross-
dressing behavior has been challenged in an evidentiary context as prejudi-
cial and excluded for its risk of bias.455 Similarly, over the decades that the
nexus test has been in place, a number of thoughtful family court and appel-
late decisions have recognized the danger posed by illegitimate factors such
as stigma or anxiety masquerading as genuine harm, and they have held that
such considerations are impermissible surrogates for a parent’s status.456 But
no statute or appellate court ruling has squarely adopted such a clear prohi-
bition. It should not require so much effort for each family court judge to
wind through the swamp of wrong choices distorted to seem reasonable by
the misleading framing of the nexus test. The risk of wrong decisions—for
children, for parents, and for our values of fairness—is too great.
This approach would appropriately bar consideration of illegitimate fac-
tors, while permitting consideration of every other factor relevant to a child’s
well-being. That could include, as Wald suggests, deferring to the wishes of
an older child, so long as that deference is applied equally regardless of the
ther’s milieu could engender homosexual fantasies causing confusion and anxiety which would
in turn affect the children’s sexual development,” as well as on the risk to the children of “ei-
ther overt or covert homosexual seduction” upon reaching puberty).
454. See WASH. CT. R. GR 37, https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.
display&group=ga&set=GR&ruleid=gagr37 [https://perma.cc/F39Z-6SK9]; see also Washing-
ton Supreme Court Is First in Nation to Adopt Rule to Reduce Implicit Racial Bias in Jury Selec-
tion, ACLU (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/news/washington-supreme-court-first-
nation-adopt-rule-reduce-implicit-racial-bias-jury-selection [https://perma.cc/G33X-8UHE]
(explaining that Washington is the first state to ban implicit bias based on race or ethnicity in
jury selection).
455 . See Robinson v. State, 415 S.E.2d 21, 23 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (noting evidence of
cross-dressing may be prejudicial and irrelevant, but permitting it because it had been raised
before without objection).
456 . See, e .g ., In re Marriage of Black, 392 P.3d 1041, 1048 (Wash. 2017) (potential for
bullying not a legitimate consideration); Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So.2d 581, 587 (Miss.
1999) (child’s embarrassment not a legitimate consideration). See generally JOSLIN ET AL., supra
note 26.
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reason for the child’s preference.457 A parent’s gender nonconformity or
transgender status, however, whether considered directly or indirectly, is
never a legitimate factor. Thus, it should have no bearing on whether a per-
son is permitted to be a parent to their children.
CONCLUSION
Our survey of the existing case law is sobering. While marriage equality
is now the law of the land and transgender people have gained ground in
many areas in recent years, transgender parents are still subject to discrimi-
nation at the hands of family court judges applying the best interest of the
child standard in custody decisions. Those courts too frequently consider il-
legitimate factors, such as anxieties around transition, to impose irreparable
harm by severing family relationships that are critical for the well-being of
both children and parents.
Fortunately, we are optimistic about the possibility for a new direction.
Following the approaches taken in other areas where unlawful bias has
threatened the validity of judicial decisionmaking, legislatures and courts of
appeal should prohibit judges from taking into account a parent’s gender
nonconformity or related factors that too-frequently masquerade as cog-
nizable harm. Transgender parents, and their children, deserve nothing less.
457 . See Wald, supra note 395, at 383, 430.
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APPENDIX A











516 P.2d 132 (Colo. App. 1973) FtM Anti Trans Parent Pro Trans Parent
In re Darnell,
619 P.2d 1349





No. 80 C.A. 113, 1982 WL 6161
(Ohio. Ct. App. July 20, 1982)
MtF Pro Trans Parent Anti Trans Parent X











715 P.2d 56 (Nev. 1986) MtF Anti Trans Parent Anti Trans Parent X X X
In re Welfare of V.H.,
412 N.W.2d 389
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
MtF* Pro Trans Parent Pro Trans Parent X X
In re Custody of T.J.,
No. C2-87-1786, 1988 WL 8302
(Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1988)
MtF Pro Trans Parent Pro Trans Parent X X
Summers-Horton v. Horton,
No. 88AP-622, 1989 WL 29421
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1989)








* Denotes cross-dressing behavior
T = Transition; V = Volition; C = Contagion
† Note that we decided to record gender identities and expression (MtF, FtM), with
some trepidation, given the potential limitations of the factual records within the opinions, as
we have explained, and the wide variance of transgender identities and expressions that may
not be adequately captured by these categories. In addition, we tried to distinguish between
cases involving cross-dressing behavior from cases that involved a transition, but here, also, we
note that these categories may only imperfectly map onto the wide variance of gender identi-
ties and expressions, and that the factual records we drew upon may not reflect the complexity
of self-identification.
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MtF* Anti Trans Parent Anti Trans Parent X X
In re Marriage of D.F.D.,
862 P.2d 368 (Mont. 1993) MtF* Anti Trans Parent Pro Trans Parent X X
P.L.W. v. T.R.W.,
890 S.W.2d 688
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994)




(Conn. Super. Ct. July 11, 1996)




(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 14, 1996)
MtF* Pro Trans Parent Pro Trans Parent
J.L.S. v. D.K.S.,
943 S.W.2d 766
(Mo. Ct. App. 1997)
MtF Anti Trans Parent Anti Trans Parent X X X
Vecchione v. Vecchione,
No. 95D003769 (Cal. Sup. Ct.,
filed Apr. 23, 1996)‡
FtM Pro Trans Parent N/A
In re L.S.,
717 N.E.2d 204
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999)
MtF Anti Trans Parent Anti Trans Parent X X
In re Marriage of Arndt,
No. 00-76, 2001 WL 487348
(Iowa Ct. App. May 9, 2001)
MtF* Anti Trans Parent Anti Trans Parent X
Kantaras v. Kantaras,
884 So. 2d 155
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
FtM Pro Trans Parent Anti Trans Parent X
Pierre v. Pierre,
2004-21496 (La. App. 1 Cir.
12/30/04); 898 So. 2d 419
FtM Anti Trans Parent Pro Trans Parent X
* Denotes cross-dressing behavior
T = Transition; V = Volition; C = Contagion
‡ The orders and opinions in this case, which was in California’s Orange County Su-
perior Court, are not published or publicly available. The trial outcome has been determined
through Taylor Flynn, Essay, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender
Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 415–16
(2001).
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825 N.E.2d 303
(Ill. Ct. App. 2005)
FtM Anti Trans Parent Anti Trans Parent X
M.B. v. D.W.,
236 S.W.3d 31
(Ky. Ct. App. 2007)
MtF Anti Trans Parent Anti Trans Parent X X
Magnuson v. Magnuson,
170 P.3d 65
(Wash. Ct. App. 2007)








M.R. v. San Mateo Cty. Superior
Court, No. A122117,
2008 WL 4650440
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2008)




FtM Pro Trans Parent N/A X
Tipsword v. Tipsword,
No. 1 CA-CV 12-0066,
2013 WL 1320444
(Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2013)










(Tex. App. March 11, 2015)
FtM Anti Trans Parent Anti Trans Parent X
Franklin v. Franklin,
No. 602, 2014, 2015 WL
3885834 (Del. June 22, 2015)
MtF Anti Trans Parent Anti Trans Parent X X
* Denotes cross-dressing behavior
T = Transition; V = Volition; C = Contagion
